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I. Introduction 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
guarantees criminal defendants “the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury.”1 As established in In re Winship,2 this 
jury guarantee also gives a criminal defendant the right to 
demand that a jury find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of 
“every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 
charged.”3 In the years following In re Winship, the Court 
expanded its interpretation of this reasonable-doubt standard by 
attempting to identify the type of facts necessary to prove a 
defendant’s criminal charge.4 A distinction eventually emerged 
between facts that constituted elements of the crime and facts 
that constituted sentencing factors.5 Elements of the crime were 
                                                                                                     
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 2. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
 3. Id. at 364; see also Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and 
Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1103 
(2001) (explaining that both the loss of liberty associated with criminal 
convictions and the need to blunt community concerns regarding the conviction 
of innocent people contributed to the formation of the reasonable-doubt 
standard); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Determinate Sentencing in Light of 
the Supreme Court’s “Elements” Jurisprudence, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1236, 1236 
(2004) (describing Winship as “constitutionalizing” the reasonable-doubt 
standard).  
 4. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 684 (1975) (assessing whether 
the prosecution must prove the absence of heat of passion on sudden provocation 
beyond a reasonable doubt in a homicide case).  
 5. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000) (noting that this 
distinction was “unknown to the practice of criminal indictment, trial by jury, 
and judgment by court as it existed during the years surrounding our Nation’s 
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charged in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
to a jury, while sentencing factors were entrusted to the 
sentencing judge under a lower standard of proof.6 In 1987, 
Congress documented this distinction in the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines (the Guidelines),7 utilizing a complex and formulaic 
sentencing scheme that allowed judges to find particular 
sentencing factors by a preponderance of the evidence and 
enhance the severity of a defendant’s punishment in correlation 
with said factors.8 It is from this foundation that modern 
sentencing procedure has developed. Following the enactment of 
the Guidelines, the Court would spend several decades (what this 
Note refers to as “the Apprendi9 revolution”) attempting to square 
the use of sentencing factors found by judges, rather than juries, 
with Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.  
After years of slowly chipping away at judicial fact-finding in 
the sentencing process, a narrow majority of the Court ended this 
complex saga of sentencing case law in Alleyne v. United States,10 
holding that any fact that increases the mandatory maximum or 
the mandatory minimum of a sentence is an “element” of the 
crime that must be submitted to the jury to be found beyond a 
reasonable doubt.11 Thus, while the Sixth Amendment does not 
expressly guarantee criminal defendants the right to sentencing 
                                                                                                     
founding”).  
 6. See Bibas, supra note 3, at 1102 (referencing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 
477 U.S. 79, 84–86, 91 (1986)); see also Benjamin J. Priester, Sentenced For a 
“Crime” the Government Did Not Prove: Jones v. United States and the 
Constitutional Limitations on Factfinding by Sentencing Factors Rather Than 
Elements of the Offense, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 249 (1998) (explaining 
that unlike elements of the crime, sentencing factors affect only the severity of 
the sentence imposed, not the defendant’s guilt or innocence, and may be found 
by a preponderance of the evidence by the judge).  
 7. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2004).  
 8. See id. § 3B1.4 (enhancing a defendant’s sentence, for example, if he 
uses a minor in the commission of the crime).  
 9. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Apprendi v. New Jersey 
marked the first case in which the Court drastically returned sentence-related 
fact-finding to the jury. See id. at 466 (holding that the Constitution requires 
that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt). 
 10. 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). 
 11. Id. at 2153. 
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by jury, the Alleyne Court ultimately determined, in an expansive 
interpretation of the Constitution, that the Sixth Amendment 
encompasses the right to have a jury find, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, any factor that enhances a criminal sentence.12  
Despite the finality of the Alleyne decision, however, one 
exception to the rule remains—prior convictions. During the 
course of the Apprendi revolution, the Court carved out one 
narrow exception in the sentencing process for recidivism; under 
its holding in Almendarez-Torres v. United States,13 the Court 
concluded that prior convictions are “sentencing factors” which 
may be determined by a judge by a preponderance of the 
evidence, and which need not be alleged in the indictment or 
proven to a jury.14 While the holding in Alleyne seemed to signal 
an end to judicial fact-finding within the sentencing process, the 
Court refused to address whether its decision had any impact on 
Almendarez-Torres, thereby leaving the prior convictions 
exception undisturbed, albeit on shaky ground.15 As a result, 
lower courts are now faced with a dilemma: despite continuing to 
uphold Almendarez-Torres as good law, many courts believe that 
the exception has been completely eroded by the Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence of the Apprendi revolution.16 
Regrettably, if the prior convictions exception is no longer valid, 
innumerable criminal defendants have received unconstitutional 
sentences under the flawed rule of Almendarez-Torres.17 Thus, it 
                                                                                                     
 12. See Molly Gulland Gaston, Never Efficient, but Always Free: How the 
Juvenile Adjudication Question Is the Latest Sign That Almendarez-Torres v. 
United States Should Be Overturned, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1167, 1167–68 (2008) 
(claiming that the Court’s decision to end judicial fact-finding within the 
sentencing process signaled a return to the Framers’ intent that the Sixth 
Amendment should protect individuals from an over-punitive government).  
 13. 523 U.S. 224 (1998). 
 14. See id. at 244 (describing the judicial system’s longstanding tradition of 
treating recidivism as a factor of punishment only).  
 15. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2160 n.1 (reasoning that because neither 
party contested Almendarez-Torres, Alleyne is not the proper vehicle to address 
the validity of the prior convictions exception).  
 16. See Velasquez v. Faulk, No. 12-CV-02057-WYD, 2014 WL 464000, at 
*21 (D. Colo. Feb. 5, 2014) (“Even though the recidivism exception announced in 
Almendarez–Torres[] has been eroded, the Supreme Court has not overruled the 
exception.”).  
 17. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 11, United States v. Murray, No. 
06-2950-CR, 2006 WL 5251426, at *10 (2d Cir. Aug. 16, 2006) (noting that 
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seems the Supreme Court will eventually need to address the 
viability of Almendarez-Torres under Alleyne so that lower courts 
can respond to criminal defendants’ challenges with a more 
definitive answer in regards to the prior convictions exception.18 
By analyzing Almendarez-Torres and its questionable 
viability under the Court’s recent holding in Alleyne, this Note 
will illustrate that the Supreme Court should not overturn the 
prior convictions exception but rather expressly sustain the rule 
as good law. Part II of this Note discusses the landscape of 
sentencing law by evaluating the history of the Guidelines and 
the inherent conflict between the Guidelines and Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence. Part III analyzes the Apprendi 
revolution and the complicated web of case law that addressed 
this constitutional conflict and built today’s criminal sentencing 
system. Finally, Part IV argues that Almendarez-Torres should 
be upheld for two main reasons: (1) the prior convictions 
exception is actually consistent with constitutional principles and 
(2) without the prior convictions exception, the criminal justice 
system would face administrative burdens that far outweigh any 
benefit of overturning the case. 
II. History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
judges enjoyed “nearly unlimited discretion” when sentencing 
criminal defendants.19 Under this “indeterminate sentencing 
system,” the defendant’s sentence was determined not only by the 
                                                                                                     
sentencing criminal defendants under a flawed prior convictions exception 
would violate “the fundamental imperative that the Court maintains absolute 
fidelity to the protections of the individual afforded by the notice, trial by jury, 
and beyond a reasonable doubt requirements” (citing Shepard v. United States, 
544 U.S. 13, 27–28 (2005))).  
 18. See Mike Gottlieb, Reconciling Ceilings and Floors: Alleyne v. United 
States, SCOTUSBLOG (June 17, 2013, 9:39 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2013/06/reconciling-ceilings-and-floors-alleyne-v-united-states/ (last visited Jan. 
26, 2015) (discussing the uncertainty of future cases under the holding in 
Alleyne and the subsequent possibility of challenges from defendants during the 
sentencing process) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 19.  Shannon Broderick, Blakely v. Washington Confuses Federal Courts: A 
Look into the Constitutionality of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 32 W. ST. U. L. 
REV. 243, 244 (2005). 
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crime itself but also by the judge’s own discretionary 
considerations, such as the character of the individual 
defendant.20 The United States Parole Commission was then 
given the ultimate authority to determine when the offender was 
“sufficiently rehabilitated to merit release.”21 Not surprisingly, 
this broad grant of judicial discretion resulted in wide disparities 
among sentences for similar crimes: “[T]here undoubtedly are 
both Santa Clauses and Scrooges on the bench. An offender’s 
punishment should not turn on the luck of the judicial draw or, 
worse, on a defense attorney’s ability to maneuver the offender’s 
case before a favorable judge.”22 By the early 1970s, disapproval 
of this discretionary sentencing system and its uncertain results 
grew into to what would become a revolution in sentencing 
procedure.23 
A. Navigating the Grid: The Mechanics of the Sentencing System 
In 1984, President Ronald Reagan introduced a “new era”24 of 
criminal justice, signing into law the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984 (SRA).25 The Act established the United States Sentencing 
                                                                                                     
 20. See id. (stating that under the system of indeterminate sentencing, a 
judge’s discretion included “any bias or factors” he wished to consider); Todd 
Witten, Note, Sentence Entrapment and Manipulation: Government 
Manipulation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AKRON L. REV. 697, 699 
(1996) (suggesting that as long as the sentence imposed did not exceed broad, 
statutory limits, federal judges’ discretion “seemed almost infinite”). 
 21. William J. Powell & Michael T. Cimino, Prosecutorial Discretion Under 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Is the Fox Guarding the Hen House?, 97 
W.VA. L. REV. 373, 378 (1995). 
 22. Witten, supra note 20, at 700 n.22 (citing Albert W. Alschuler, The 
Failure of the Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 901, 901 (1991)). 
 23. See Adam Ford, Note, Three Shots into a Black Santa That May 
Unwittingly Start an Overhaul of America’s Criminal System: Apprendi v. New 
Jersey and the Restructuring of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 12 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 249, 252–53 (2001) (“[T]hese factors produced an unusual 
coalescence of the left, which cited concern over disparate sentences, and the 
right, which charged that the criminals were ‘getting off easy.’ These sides 
joined forces to overhaul the entire criminal system in America.”). 
 24. Impact of Uncle Sam’s New Crime Law, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT 
50 (Oct. 22, 1984). 
 25. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3559, 3561–3566, 3571–3574, 3581–
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Commission (the Commission),26 which was charged with the 
responsibility of promulgating a new, more uniform sentencing 
system.27 In 1987, the Commission completed the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual,28 which bound judges to specific ranges of 
punishment for particular crimes and required that all facts 
relevant to the sentence be found by a preponderance of the 
evidence.29 Establishing a “modified real offense” system, the 
Commission based the length of an offender’s sentence not only 
on the crime itself, but also on an offender’s actual behavior.30 
The new guidelines directed the judge to follow a series of steps 
involving a formulated sentencing grid to calculate a score that 
would indicate the appropriate sentence.31 First, the judge 
identified the “base offense level”32 using the statutory index to 
                                                                                                     
3586, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2012)); see also Broderick, supra note 19, at 244 
(“After enduring sentence disparities for years, President Ronald Reagan 
decided to take action to resolve the injustice.”).  
 26. 98 Stat. at 2017 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2012)).  
 27. See 98 Stat. at 2019 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) 
(2012)) (delegating the task of promulgating guidelines for use by a sentencing 
court to the Commission, specifically by an affirmative vote of at least four 
members); see also David C. Holman, Death by a Thousand Cases: After Booker, 
Rita, and Gall, the Guidelines Still Violate the Sixth Amendment, 50 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 267, 271–72 (2008) (mentioning the ambiguity of the Act’s 
directives). 
 28. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2004); see Broderick, supra note 
19, at 245 (emphasizing that the Guidelines, while not considered actual 
statutes, were binding on the courts). 
 29. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 (“The Commission 
believes that use of a preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate to 
meet due process requirements and policy concerns . . . .”); Eric P. Berlin, The 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ Failure to Eliminate Sentencing Disparity: 
Governmental Manipulations Before Arrest, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 187, 187 (1993) 
(addressing the Guidelines’ principal aim of curtailing judicial discretion and 
establishing a sense of certainty within the sentencing system). The Guidelines 
also addressed a shift in the societal view of criminal punishment, replacing 
rehabilitation with incapacitation and retribution. See Ford, supra note 23, at 
253 (noting an increased belief that the rehabilitation of criminals was 
impossible). 
 30. Bibas, supra note 3, at 1169; see also James E. Felman, The 
Fundamental Incompatibility of Real Offense Sentencing Guidelines and the 
Federal Criminal Code, 7 FED. SENT. R. 125, 125 (1994) (stating that this type of 
system placed more emphasis on what the offender actually did during the 
offense). 
 31. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2004). 
 32. Id. § 1B1.1(a)(1)–(2). 
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locate the statute of conviction.33 The judge subsequently 
adjusted the offense level by adding specific offense factors and 
any appropriate adjustments listed by the Guidelines.34 Next, the 
judge used the Guidelines to calculate the offender’s criminal 
history category.35 After determining the base offense level and 
the criminal history score, the judge consulted the Guidelines’ 
sentencing grid to locate the meeting point of the two scores.36 
This intersection provided the judge with a range of months for 
which the offender could be incarcerated.37 The judge could then 
depart from the calculated range by finding unusual factors that 
were not adequately considered by the Commission.38 “If the 
Commission has done its job as it hopes, the resulting term of 
confinement . . . should strike most observers as about the typical 
time such an offender would have served prior to the 
Guidelines.”39 
                                                                                                     
 33. Id.; see also Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the 
Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 6 (1988). 
Justice Breyer used the following scenario to illustrate how a federal judge 
should utilize the Guidelines to locate a base offense level: A bank robber with 
one serious prior conviction robs a bank of $40,000 while pointing a gun at the 
bank teller. Id. Using the index, the judge must look up “Robbery” under § 2B3.1 
of the Guidelines. Id. The judge must then locate this section in the Manual and 
find the base offense level, which is “Level 18.” Id. 
 34. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(2)–(3). Specific offense 
factors are listed under each individual offense section; for example, under 
§ 2B2.3 for “Trespass,” the base offense level increases by four levels if the 
offense occurred at the White House. Id. § 2B2.3(b)(2). The Guidelines’ third 
chapter lists general adjustments; for example, using a minor to commit a crime 
increases a base offense level by two levels. Id. § 3B1.4; see also Breyer, supra 
note 33, at 6 (continuing the “Robbery” scenario, the base offense level would 
increase—based on offense-specific factors—by two levels for the money stolen 
and three levels for the use of a gun, thereby amounting to “Level 23”). 
 35. Id. § 1B1.1(a)(6); see also Breyer, supra note 33, at 6 (continuing the 
“Robbery” scenario, § 4A1.1 of the Guidelines would assign three points to the 
offender’s criminal history score for one prior serious conviction). 
 36. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(7). 
 37. Id. § 1B1.1(a)(8); see also Breyer, supra note 33, at 7 (concluding the 
“Robbery” scenario, an offense level of “23” with three points for the offender’s 
prior conviction would yield a range of fifty-one to sixty-three months in prison 
for the armed robbery by a previously convicted felon). 
 38. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2012) (allowing the sentencing judge to depart 
from the prescribed range upon the finding of “an aggravating or mitigating 
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration 
by the Sentencing Commission”). 
 39. Breyer, supra note 33, at 7. 
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B. Conflict Between the Guidelines and the Sixth Amendment 
Despite the initial support for this sentencing reform,40 the 
overly complex and lengthy Sentencing Guidelines quickly fell 
into disfavor.41 Critics of the Guidelines, including one of its most 
notable architects, Justice Stephen Breyer, denounced the 
system’s complicated, mechanical sentencing formula as well as 
its excessive provisions and distinctions.42 Other critics attacked 
the system’s replacement of deliberation and moral judgment: 
“By replacing the case-by-case exercise of human judgment with a 
mechanical calculus, we do not judge better or more objectively, 
nor do we judge worse. Instead, we cease to judge at all.”43  
Most important, and for the purposes of this Note, 
application of the new Guidelines revealed a tension between the 
sentencing system and the Sixth Amendment. Under the new 
sentencing system, the judge made critical findings regarding the 
defendant’s conduct in order to calculate an appropriate 
sentence—these findings included certain “sentencing factors” 
that had the potential to increase the defendant’s statutory 
exposure to a longer, more severe sentence.44 These sentencing 
                                                                                                     
 40. See M.K.B. Darmer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Blakely 
and Booker: The Limits of Congressional Tolerance and a Greater Role for 
Juries, 56 S.C. L. REV. 533, 540 (2005) (noting that liberals and conservatives 
alike sponsored the bill, including Senators Kennedy, Hatch, Biden, and 
Thurmond). 
 41. See Linda Greenhouse, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Criticized by a 
Key Supporter, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1998, at A10 (“[P]unishment in federal 
courts is . . . marked by a technical language—‘base levels,’ ‘categories,’ ‘points,’ 
‘scores,’ and so on—that resonates like the jargon of actuaries or tax 
accountants . . . .”). 
 42. See id. (mentioning the dozens of senior federal judges who announced 
that they would refuse to hear certain cases based on the severity of the 
Guidelines). 
 43. KATE SMITH & JOSÉ CABRENES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 78, 81–83 (1998); see also Erik Luna, 
Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of Federal Sentencing, 96 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 25, 38–39 (2005) (“The defendant is now a two-dimensional 
character . . . his vertical axis an offense level and his horizontal axis a criminal 
history category. There is no depth or detail . . . only an initial movement within 
the grid pursuant to points or levels . . . .”). 
 44. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 152 (1997) (“Conduct that is 
not formally charged or is not an element of the offense of conviction may enter 
into the determination of the applicable guideline sentencing range.” (citing U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(2) cmt. background (1987) 
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factors appeared both in criminal statutes and in the Guidelines 
themselves.45 Criminal statutory enhancements typically 
increased the maximum sentence that the judge could impose, or 
in some instances, triggered the mandatory minimum sentence.46 
Thus, if the judge found that a certain circumstance existed in 
connection with the commission of a crime, “the duration of the 
defendant’s incarceration would be substantially longer than it 
would have been in the absence of the circumstance.”47 The 
Guidelines functioned in a similar manner in that “[t]he relevant 
conduct provisions [were] designed to channel the sentencing 
discretion of the district courts and to make mandatory the 
consideration of factors that previously would have been 
optional.”48 Examples of such sentencing factors include the 
Guidelines’ aforementioned list of adjustments, such as whether 
the offense constituted a hate crime,49 and offense-based 
characteristics, such as whether the offense involved the reckless 
operation of a vehicle.50 Accordingly, if the judge found any such 
sentencing factors, he could then increase the defendant’s base 
offense level, which would in turn lead to a lengthier sentence 
within the prescribed range.51  
                                                                                                     
(amended 2004))). 
 45. See Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The 
Role of Prior Drug Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1135, 1143–44 (2010) (noting that statutory factors are typically mandatory in 
that courts must apply them when the facts support the enhancement). 
 46. See id. (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 924 (2012)). 
 47. Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the 
Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 61, 64 (1993). 
For example, under 21 U.S.C. § 841, the legislature set a minimum term of ten 
years’ imprisonment if a defendant is convicted of knowingly manufacturing or 
distributing a controlled substance, for example “1 kilogram or more of a 
mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of heroin.” 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a)–(b)(1)(A) (2012). If it is found that death or serious bodily injury 
resulted from the use of such substances, however, the statutory minimum is 
raised to at least twenty years’ imprisonment. Id. 
 48. Darmer, supra note 40, at 544 n.54 (citing Witte v. United States, 515 
U.S. 389, 402 (1995)). 
 49. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1 (2004).  
 50. Id. § 2A1.4(a)(2)(B). 
 51. See id. § 1B1.1(a)(7) (indicating that the higher the offense level sits on 
the sentencing grid’s axis, the higher the sentencing range will spread). The 
Court expanded on these sentencing factors in Witte v. United States, explaining 
the ways in which the Guidelines and statutes work in tandem:  
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Herein lies the central conflict between the Guidelines and 
the Sixth Amendment. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines gave 
judges the responsibility of finding sentencing factors by a 
preponderance of the evidence.52 In certain instances, however, 
the judge’s findings would necessarily go beyond the jury’s guilty 
verdict or those facts admitted by the defendant at the plea 
hearing,53 thereby challenging the long-held assumption that 
“proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is 
constitutionally required.”54 As Professor Mark Osler has argued, 
the defendant’s constitutional rights are lost “when facts are 
proven at a lower standard before the judge, rather than beyond a 
reasonable doubt before the jury.”55 The Guidelines’ shift away 
from jury fact-finding created an obvious conflict between the 
jury trial requirements of the Sixth Amendment and the judge’s 
ability to enhance a defendant’s sentence based on factors that 
were not found by the jury.56 As expected, this conflict 
complicated courts’ navigation of the new, determinate 
sentencing system and raised the question of whether these 
                                                                                                     
The relevant conduct provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines, like 
their criminal history counterparts and the recidivism statutes . . . . 
are sentencing enhancement regimes evincing the judgment that a 
particular offense should receive a more serious sentence within the 
authorized [statutory] range if it was either accompanied by or 
preceded by additional criminal activity. 
515 U.S. at 402.  
 52. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. (“The 
Commission believes that use of a preponderance of the evidence standard is 
appropriate to meet due process requirements . . . .”); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 
477 U.S. 79, 80 (1986) (“The preponderance standard satisfies due process. 
Sentencing courts have traditionally heard evidence and found facts without 
any prescribed burden of proof at all.”). 
 53. See Darmer, supra note 40, at 544 (“For example, even if the evidence 
introduced at trial was limited to powder cocaine, at sentencing the judge may 
find that the defendant also distributed heroin in connection with the overall 
drug distribution scheme.”). 
 54. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970).  
 55. Mark Osler, Must Have Got Lost: Traditional Sentencing Goals, the 
False Trail of Uniformity and Process, and the Way Back Home, 54 S.C. L. REV. 
649, 680 (2003). “Fact-finding was historically a function of trial, and its shift to 
sentencing has resulted in an unsettling loss of rights.” Id. at 652. 
 56. See Broderick, supra note 19, at 251 (describing the issue of whether 
the Guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment in situations when a judge, not a 
jury, finds a fact that leads to an enhanced sentence). 
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enhancement factors were simply sentencing factors to be found 
by the judge or actual elements of the offense to be found by the 
jury.57  
As discussed in Part I, this Note focuses on one enhancement 
factor in particular—prior convictions. Recidivist 
enhancements,58 which increase a sentence based on the 
defendant’s prior criminal history, are traditionally justified 
under the main theories of punishment: “Indeed, the federal 
sentencing guidelines, which rely on criminal history to 
determine a defendant’s sentencing range, explicitly state that a 
defendant’s past criminal conduct is relevant to the four purposes 
of sentencing set forth by federal statute: retribution, deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.”59 As evidenced by the holding 
in Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme Court has carved out a clear 
distinction between recidivist enhancements and nonrecidivist 
enhancements in the context of sentencing.60 While the Court 
                                                                                                     
 57. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 466 (2000) (addressing 
whether the Sixth Amendment’s notice and jury trial guarantees require that 
any fact that increases the maximum penalty for a crime be charged in an 
indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt); Katie 
M. McVoy, Note, “What I Have Feared Most Has Now Come to Pass”: Blakely, 
Booker, and the Future of Sentencing, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1613, 1614 (2005) 
(describing how the United States Supreme Court began to cast doubt on the 
constitutionality of determinate guidelines systems under the Sixth 
Amendment). 
 58. See Russell, supra note 45, at 1143 (explaining that nonrecidivist 
enhancements are those that increase a sentence based on the circumstances of 
an offense). 
 59. Id. at 1150. 
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act sets forth four purposes of 
sentencing. A defendant’s record of past criminal conduct is directly 
relevant to those purposes. A defendant with a record of prior 
criminal behavior is more culpable than a first offender and thus 
deserving of greater punishment. General deterrence of criminal 
conduct dictates that a clear message be sent to society that repeated 
criminal behavior will aggravate the need for punishment with each 
recurrence. To protect the public from further crimes of the particular 
defendant, the likelihood of recidivism and future criminal behavior 
must be considered. Repeated criminal behavior is an indicator of a 
limited likelihood of successful rehabilitation. 
Id. at 1150 n.78 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 
introductory cmt. (2004)).  
 60. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230 (1998) 
(“[T]he lower courts have almost uniformly interpreted statutes (that authorize 
higher sentences for recidivists) as setting forth sentencing factors, not as 
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ultimately determined that a jury must find any fact that 
increases the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal 
defendant is exposed,61 prior convictions remain unique in that a 
judge may find their existence at a lower standard of proof 
despite the fact that such a conviction could raise the defendant’s 
sentencing range.62 Whether or not this prior convictions 
exception remains viable under the Court’s recent holding in 
Alleyne v. United States, however, requires a look back at the case 
law that has attempted to address this conflict.  
III. The Saga of Sentencing Case Law 
A. McMillan v. Pennsylvania: Introducing “Sentencing 
Enhancements” 
One of the first major cases to lay the groundwork for the 
Sixth Amendment sentencing debate was McMillan v. 
Pennsylvania.63 In this 5–4 decision, the Court coined “the term 
‘sentencing factor’ to refer to a fact that was not found by a jury 
but that could affect the sentence imposed by the judge.”64 The 
                                                                                                     
creating new crimes . . . .”). 
 61. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2153 (2013) (claiming 
that the Sixth Amendment provides defendants with the right to have a jury 
find those nonrecidivist factors beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 62. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 242 (“[T]he Court said long ago that 
a State need not allege a defendant’s prior conviction in the indictment or 
information that alleges the elements of an underlying crime.”). 
 63. 477 U.S. 79 (1986); see also John M. Parese, Putting the Tail Between 
the Dog’s Legs: The Danger of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 
645, 654 (2002) (referencing Mark D. Knoll & Richard G. Singer, Searching for 
the “Tail of the Dog”: Finding “Elements” of Crimes in the Wake of McMillan v. 
Pennsylvania, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1999)).  
McMillan marked the birth of the “sentencing factor,” a concept that 
radically restructured roles of judge and jury by shifting to the court 
the ability to make at sentencing, and by a preponderance of the 
evidence, factual determinations that, prior to McMillan, had to be 
made by juries, at trial, and beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Id. It is important to note that at the time McMillan was decided, the federal 
guidelines system was in its “developmental stages,” and only a few states had 
sentencing guidelines of their own. NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING 
LAW AND POLICY 450 (3d ed. 2013). 
 64. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 485 (2000).  
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case involved a challenge to Pennsylvania’s Mandatory Minimum 
Sentencing Act,65 which required a mandatory minimum sentence 
of five years if the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant “visually possessed a firearm” during the 
commission of certain underlying offenses.66 The statute further 
provided that “visible possession” was not an element of the crime 
but rather a sentencing factor.67 In determining whether the 
prosecution must prove the possession factor beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the Court relied on Patterson v. New York,68 a fundamental 
case in the debate surrounding constitutional sentencing 
procedures.69 Patterson placed great weight on the state 
legislature’s duty to define crimes and prescribe penalties: “It 
goes without saying that preventing and dealing with crime is 
much more the business of the States than it is of the Federal 
Government.”70 Under Patterson, the legislature’s definition of 
the crime is usually dispositive, and therefore the prosecution 
need only prove those elements included in the definition of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.71  
In keeping with Patterson, the McMillan Court held that “a 
State may treat visible possession of a firearm as a sentencing 
factor rather than an element of the offense that must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”72 The Pennsylvania legislature 
expressly provided that visual possession was a sentencing 
consideration, not an element of the offense.73 The fact that the 
                                                                                                     
 65. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982).  
 66. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 79 (noting that the sentencing factor was 
meant to prevent judges from imposing a sentence of less than five years for the 
underlying felony).  
 67. See id. (stating that the possession factor does not authorize a sentence 
in excess of that otherwise allowed, or in other words, in excess of the maximum 
prescribed sentence). 
 68. 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
 69. See Jason E. Barsanti, Note, Ring v. Arizona: The Sixth and Eighth 
Amendments Collide: Out of the Wreckage Emerges a Constitutional Safeguard 
for Capital Defendants, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 519, 530 (2004) (claiming that 
Patterson v. New York played an “integral” role in the decisions of Apprendi v. 
New Jersey and Ring v. Arizona). 
 70. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201 (referencing Irvine v. California, 347 
U.S. 128, 134 (1954)).  
 71. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85 (referencing Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210).  
 72. Id. at 79. 
 73. See id. at 88 (stating that there was no indication that the statute had 
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legislature decided to base the severity of the sentence on the 
presence (or absence) of a particular fact did not automatically 
make that fact an “element” of the offense.74 Rather, the visual 
possession factor “[came] into play only after the defendant [had] 
been found guilty of one of the enumerated crimes beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”75 Additionally, the provision at issue only 
raised the mandatory minimum sentence, thereby limiting the 
sentencing court to a penalty already within the range that 
otherwise applied.76  
In response to the defendants’ Sixth Amendment claim (that 
the jury must determine all ultimate facts concerning the offense 
committed), the Court reiterated that the Pennsylvania 
legislature is free to treat visible possession as a sentencing 
consideration, and as a result, there is no right to jury 
sentencing, even if the sentence turns on a specific finding of 
fact.77 The McMillan Court did maintain, however, that there are 
constitutional limits to a state’s power to define the elements of a 
criminal offense.78 Justice Stevens elaborated on these 
constitutional limitations in his dissent, claiming that “[i]f a 
State provides that a specific component of a prohibited 
transaction shall give rise both to a special stigma and to a 
special punishment, that component must be treated as a ‘fact 
necessary to constitute the crime.’”79 Justice Stevens further 
argued that the criminally accused are owed a level of “accurate 
factfinding” and that by allowing a state legislature to disregard 
such safeguards, the Court violates the beyond-a-reasonable-
                                                                                                     
“been tailored to permit the visible possession finding to be a tail which wags 
the dog of the substantive offense”).  
 74. See id. at 79 (referencing Patterson, 432 U.S. at 214). 
 75. Id. at 79–80 (emphasis added).  
 76. See id. at 87–88 (making special note of the fact that the statute did not 
raise the maximum penalty for the crime, a distinction that proves significant in 
future sentencing cases).  
 77. See id. (referencing Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984)).  
 78. See id. at 86 (“[I]n certain limited circumstances Winship’s reasonable-
doubt requirement applies to facts not formally identified as elements of the 
offense charged.”). The McMillan Court did not specifically identify, however, 
what kind of legislative action would run afoul of those limits. See id. (noting 
that the Court would not attempt to precisely define those constitutional limits 
as mentioned in Patterson).  
 79. Id. at 103 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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doubt standard of In re Winship.80 Justice Stevens would revisit 
and remedy these same concerns fourteen years later when 
writing the majority opinion in Apprendi v. New Jersey.81  
B. Almendarez-Torres v. United States 
Twelve years after McMillan, the Court continued its 
assessment of determinate sentencing in Almendarez-Torres v. 
United States, this time in the context of recidivist 
enhancements. According to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a),82 it is unlawful 
for a deported alien to reenter the United States without special 
permission.83 Violation of § 1326(a) triggers a maximum term of 
two years’ imprisonment.84 Subsection (b)(2) provides for a 
maximum term of twenty years’ imprisonment if the alien’s 
deportation is “subsequent to a conviction for commission of an 
aggravated felony.”85 Defendant Hugo Almendarez-Torres pled 
guilty to violating § 1326, having been deported pursuant to three 
convictions for aggravated felonies and subsequently reentering 
the United States without authorization.86 The district court 
sentenced Almendarez-Torres to eighty-five months’ 
imprisonment under the applicable Guidelines range, and he 
appealed.87 Almendarez-Torres argued that the Government was 
required to allege his prior convictions in the indictment and 
prove those convictions beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury.88 
Given that the indictment failed to include his aggravated felony 
                                                                                                     
 80. See id. at 102 (“It would demean the importance of the reasonable-
doubt standard—indeed, it would demean the Constitution itself—if the 
substance of the standard could be avoided by nothing more than a legislative 
declaration that prohibited conduct is not an ‘element’ of a crime.”). 
 81. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 467 (2000) (reiterating the 
constitutional limits to “[s]tates’ authority to define away facts necessary to 
constitute a criminal offense” (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85–88)). 
 82. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2012). 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. § 1326(b)(2).  
 86. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 224 (1998).  
 87. Id. at 224.  
 88. See id. at 223 (referencing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 
(1974), which provided that an indictment must set forth each element of the 
crime charged). 
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convictions, Almendarez-Torres claimed that the court could only 
invoke the maximum imprisonment of two years as authorized by 
§ 1326.89 The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s sentence, 
and a closely divided Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that 
Congress may treat a recidivist enhancement based on a 
defendant’s prior convictions as a sentencing factor, rather than 
an element of the crime.90 The Court therefore determined that 
subsection (b)(2) was not an element of the crime but rather a 
penalty provision to be found by a preponderance of the evidence 
by a judge.91  
Like McMillan, the Almendarez-Torres Court was split 5–4, 
with the narrow majority consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer.92 Writing 
for the Court, Justice Breyer approached the sentencing issue as 
one of statutory construction.93 The majority first looked to the 
subject matter of the statute (recidivism) to determine whether 
Congress intended for subsection (b)(2) to constitute an element 
of the crime or a sentencing factor.94 Emphasizing the well-
established tradition of recidivism, the Court maintained that the 
prior commission of a serious crime “is as typical a sentencing 
factor as one might imagine,”95 and consequently, lower courts 
have “almost uniformly” interpreted statutes that increase 
sentences for recidivists as providing sentencing factors, rather 
                                                                                                     
 89. See id. at 227 (noting that two years’ imprisonment was the maximum 
penalty authorized for an offender without a prior conviction).  
 90. See id. at 225 (stating that a legislature’s decision to treat recidivism as 
a sentencing factor does not exceed constitutional limits on the legislature’s 
authority to define the elements of a crime).  
 91. See id. at 224–25 (concluding that the prosecution did not need to allege 
the defendant’s prior convictions in the indictment or prove said convictions to a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt in order to trigger the enhancement of the 
statutory maximum).  
 92. See id. at 226 (listing the division of votes).  
 93. See Bibas, supra note 3, at 1108 (suggesting that the holding in 
Almendarez-Torres turned on congressional intent, given that legislatures 
traditionally define the elements of an offense as provided in McMillan). 
 94. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 228–29 (explaining that while an 
indictment must set forth all elements of the crime charged, it need not allege 
factors only relevant to the sentencing procedure (citing Hamling v. United 
States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974))).  
 95. See id. at 230 (listing various statutes that mandate increased 
sentences for recidivists).  
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than elements of the offense.96 After reaffirming its endorsement 
of this longstanding tradition,97 the Court then turned its 
attention to an examination of the statute’s language.  
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, subsection (a) provides that, “subject 
to subsection (b),”98 any alien who has been deported and since 
reentered the United States illegally shall be fined or imprisoned 
for no more than two years.99 Subsection (b)(2) provides that, 
“notwithstanding subsection (a),”100 any alien as described in 
subsection (a) whose deportation was subsequent to a conviction 
for commission of an aggravated felony shall be fined or 
imprisoned no more than twenty years.101 The majority concluded 
that the phrases “subject to subsection (b)” and “notwithstanding 
subsection (a)” clearly demonstrate that Congress intended for 
the crime set forth in subsection (a) to be “subject to” 
subsection (b)’s enhanced penalties when the alien is also a 
felon.102 If Congress had intended for subsection (b) to set forth 
substantive crimes, it would make little sense to include the 
phrases “subject to” and “notwithstanding.”103 
The majority also pointed to the circumstances surrounding 
subsection (b)’s adoption. When Congress added subsection (b) to 
§ 1326 in 1988, the original language of subsection (a) was as 
follows: “Any alien who has been . . . deported . . . and thereafter 
enters . . . the United States . . . shall be guilty of a felony, and 
upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment of not 
more than two years . . . .”104 Examining this operative language, 
the majority noted that at the time of the amendment, 
                                                                                                     
 96. See id. (referencing a string of cases that support the traditional 
interpretation of recidivism as a sentencing factor, not an offense element).  
 97. See Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 629 (1912) (concluding that 
recidivism speaks to the punishment of the offense, rather than the 
commission).  
 98. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2012). 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. § 1326(b)(2). 
 101. Id.  
 102. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1998) 
(citing § 1326).  
 103. See id. (stating that federal courts have always presumed that 
Congress did not intend for a defendant to be cumulatively punished for two 
crimes where one is a lesser included offense of the other).  
 104. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (1988) (emphasis added) (amended 1990). 
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subsection (a) addressed the offender’s guilt, while subsection (b) 
referred only to punishment, thereby indicating that Congress 
solely intended to implement a sentencing consideration.105 While 
the dissent argued that Congress eventually struck the 
aforementioned language (“shall be guilty of . . .”) from 
subsection (a) pursuant to the Immigration Act of 1990,106 the 
majority maintained that the 1990 amendment was merely a 
housekeeping matter and did not suggest any intention to change 
the relationship between subsection (a) and subsection (b).107 
Moreover, the heading of subsection (b), “Criminal penalties for 
reentry of certain deported aliens,”108 further supported the 
majority’s interpretation.109 While a title containing the word 
“penalties” is not necessarily dispositive, the majority argued that 
legislative history demonstrates that Congress intentionally 
drafted subsection (b) to signal a provision that addresses 
penalties, rather than a substantive crime.110  
Finally, the majority concluded that any contrary 
interpretation would “risk unfairness.”111 If subsection (b) 
provided for a separate crime, rather than a sentencing factor, 
the Government would need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
                                                                                                     
 105. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 232–34.  
Although one could read the language, “any alien described in 
[subsection (a)],” standing alone, as importing subsection (a)’s 
elements into new offenses defined in subsection (b) . . . it seems more 
likely that Congress simply meant to “describe” an alien who, in the 
words of the 1988 statute, was “guilty of a felony” defined in 
subsection (a) and “convict[ed] thereof.” 
Id. 
 106. Pub. L. No. 100-649, 104 Stat. 5059 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101 (2012)).   
 107. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 233–34 (explaining that the 
amendment to subsection (a) was one of many amendments under the 
Immigration Act of 1990 meant to “uniformly” simplify the phrasing of various 
penalty provisions in the Immigration and Naturalization Act). 
 108. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 109. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 324 (claiming that the heading of a 
section is helpful in resolving doubts regarding the meaning of a statute 
(referencing Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519 (1947))).  
 110. See id. (listing various legislative records referring to subsection (b) as 
a penalty scheme). “The statutory language is somewhat complex. But after 
considering the matter in context, we believe the interpretative circumstances 
point significantly in one direction.” Id. at 238. 
 111. Id. at 234.  
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to a jury that the defendant was deported subsequent to a 
conviction for an aggravated felony.112 Introducing evidence of the 
defendant’s prior convictions, however, would risk significant 
prejudice.113 The majority noted that even if a defendant’s 
stipulation concealed the name and the details of the prior 
offense from the jury, “the government is entitled to prove a prior 
felony offense through introduction of probative evidence.”114 
Thus, jurors would ultimately discover (whether from the 
indictment, the judge, or the prosecutor) that the defendant 
committed an aggravated felony.115 The majority, therefore, 
concluded that Congress, in adding subsection (b) to § 1326, could 
not have intended “to create this kind of unfairness in respect to 
facts that are almost never contested.”116 While the majority did 
not spend a significant amount of time discussing this issue, the 
risk of prejudice would remain one of the chief factors preserving 
the recidivist exception in Almendarez-Torres.117 As argued in the 
final section of this Note, the risk of prejudice may in fact be an 
integral reason to uphold Almendarez-Torres as good law post-
Alleyne. 
After examining the statute itself, the majority turned its 
attention to reconciling Almendarez-Torres with the Court’s 
reasoning in McMillan v. United States. While the two cases are 
similar in many ways,118 they also differ in two major respects. 
                                                                                                     
 112. Id. at 234–35.  
 113. See id. at 235 (noting that, as the Court concluded in Old Chief v. 
United States, 519 U.S. 172, 185 (1997), the “nature” of the prior offense would 
inevitably give rise to prejudice). 
 114. See id. at 235 (referencing Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 192, 
178–79 (1997) (citing United States v. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d 688, 690 (9th Cir. 
1993))).  
 115. See id. (suggesting that evidence of Almendarez-Torres’s aggravated 
felony would unfairly influence the jury).  
 116. See id. (implying that the presence of prior convictions is rarely 
contested). 
 117. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 521 (2000) (stating that one 
of the most common reasons for treating recidivism differently, as demonstrated 
in Almendarez-Torres, is the concern for prejudicing the jury by introducing 
evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction(s)); Gaston, supra note 12, at 1179 
(acknowledging that a defendant’s prior convictions might make him 
unsympathetic to a jury, especially considering the Founders’ intent for the 
Sixth Amendment).  
 118. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 242–43 (noting, for example, that 
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The majority first pointed to the traditional role of recidivism as 
opposed to possession of a firearm: “[T]he Court said long ago 
that a State need not allege a defendant’s prior conviction in the 
indictment or information that alleges the elements of an 
underlying crime, even though the conviction was ‘necessary to 
bring the case within the statute.’”119 Echoed throughout 
Almendarez-Torres, the majority reiterated that recidivism is 
possibly the most well-established basis for enhancing an 
offender’s penalty; to label recidivism as an “element” of the 
offense would “mark an abrupt departure” from this tradition of 
treating recidivism as a sentencing factor.120  
The majority then addressed the second major difference 
between McMillan and Almendarez-Torres, that unlike the 
Pennsylvania statute in McMillan, § 1326(b) triggered an 
increase in the maximum penalty, rather than the minimum, and 
created a wider range of punishment.121 The majority concluded, 
however, that this difference did not affect the “constitutional 
outcome” of the case.122 The increase of a mandatory maximum 
penalty carries no more, if not less, risk of unfairness than the 
increase in a mandatory minimum; as Justice Stevens warned in 
McMillan, a mandatory minimum actually has the capacity to 
“mandate a minimum sentence of imprisonment more than twice 
as severe as the maximum the trial judge would otherwise have 
imposed.”123 Because the McMillan Court did not rest its ultimate 
decision upon the aforementioned distinction, the difference 
between maximum and minimum penalties was not 
                                                                                                     
neither statute at issue transgressed the limits set forth in Patterson and that 
both “simply took one factor that has always been considered by sentencing 
courts to bear on punishment . . . and dictated the precise weight to be given 
that factor” (citing McMillan v. United States, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986))). 
 119. Id. at 243 (citing Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 624 (1912)). 
 120. See id. at 244 (referencing Graham, 224 U.S. at 629). 
 121. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2012) (raising the maximum penalty from 
two years’ imprisonment to twenty years’ imprisonment for those aliens who 
were deported pursuant to a prior aggravated felony), with 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 9712 (1982) (raising the mandatory minimum sentence to five years’ 
imprisonment for visible possession of a firearm). 
 122. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 243; see also Bibas, supra note 3, at 
1109 (stating that this difference actually favored the defendants).  
 123. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244–45 (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 95 
(Stevens, J., dissenting)). A mandatory minimum can essentially eliminate all of 
the sentencing judge’s discretion. Id. at 245.  
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determinative in Almendarez-Torres.124 Finally, the majority 
concluded that McMillan further supported the conclusion that 
Congress has the constitutional power to treat a fact, such as the 
prior conviction of an aggravated felony, as a sentencing factor, 
rather than an element of the crime.125 
Justice Breyer closed the opinion by briefly responding to 
Almendarez-Torres’s final argument—that any significant 
increase in a statutory maximum sentence should trigger a 
“constitutional elements requirement.”126 The Court quickly 
rejected this theory, stating that such a requirement would be 
inconsistent given the existing case law that allows a judge, 
rather than a jury, to determine certain factors that may expose a 
defendant to the death penalty, “a punishment far more severe 
than that faced by petitioner here.”127 Interestingly, critics of the 
recidivist exception would later employ this death penalty 
argument against the precedent of Almendarez-Torres.128  
While the majority’s analysis of recidivist enhancements is 
instrumental in understanding the various rationales behind the 
Almendarez-Torres exception, the vigorous dissent of Justice 
Scalia (joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg) 
arguably plays an even more paramount role in the conflict 
between recidivist enhancements and the Sixth Amendment’s 
jury trial guarantee. The dissent in Almendarez-Torres signaled 
what would evolve into a decade-long movement away from the 
                                                                                                     
 124. See id. at 245 (noting that while the McMillan Court claimed that the 
defendant’s argument would have had “more superficial appeal” if the 
sentencing factor triggered a greater or additional punishment, the statement 
meant no more than that—superficial appeal).  
 125. See id. at 246 (claiming that the Court in McMillan established that the 
Constitution permits a legislature to require a longer sentence for gun 
possession, thereby suggesting the same for recidivism).  
 126. Id. at 247. 
 127. See id. (referencing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990)); Hildwin v. 
Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989); and Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 477 (1984)). 
 128. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 584 (2002) (overruling Walton v. 
Arizona to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge to find an aggravating 
circumstance necessary for the death penalty). The Court eventually revoked 
the authority of sentencing judges to find those factors necessary to trigger the 
death penalty, thereby chipping away at one of the pillars of Almendarez-Torres. 
See id. at 585 (suggesting that a jury, not a judge, is the correct adjudicatory 
body to find any element, including those aggravating factors triggering the 
death penalty, that bring about a greater offense). 
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judicial fact-finding of determinate sentencing procedures.129 
Focusing in large part on the constitutional questions stemming 
from the majority’s statutory interpretation, the dissent 
effectively foreshadowed the Sixth Amendment challenges that 
would consume the Court during the Apprendi revolution.130 The 
dissent first argued that the statute at issue, § 1326, was 
ambiguous on its face as to whether subsection (b)(2) constituted 
an entirely separate offense or a mere sentencing enhancement 
as indicated by the majority.131 “‘[W]here a statute is susceptible 
of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful 
constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such 
questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.’”132 
According to the dissent, the majority’s interpretation of § 1326, 
which allows a judge, by a preponderance of the evidence, to 
determine a fact that increases a defendant’s maximum penalty 
undeniably triggers the “constitutional doubt” canon.133 
                                                                                                     
 129. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2153 (2013) (holding that 
“any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an ‘element’ that must be 
submitted to the jury”); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005) 
(concluding that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are hereinafter advisory 
guidelines, rather than mandatory); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304 
(2004) (solidifying the Apprendi rule); Ring, 536 U.S. at 584 (overruling Walton 
v. Arizona, and, as a result, a sentencing judge’s authority to find aggravating 
circumstances that trigger the death penalty); Apprendi v. United States, 530 
U.S. 466, 466 (2000) (holding that “[t]he Constitution requires that any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum . . . must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt”). 
 130. See Gaston, supra note 12, at 1171 (stating that in later cases, for 
example Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakely v. Washington, the Court would 
openly repudiate much of Almendarez-Torres and seek a broader interpretation 
of the right to a jury).  
 131. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 248 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting 
that in prior cases addressing the issue of sentencing enhancements, the 
statutes in question “unambiguously relieved the prosecution of the burden of 
proving a critical fact to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt”). In McMillan v. 
Pennsylvania, the statute at issue specifically provided that visible possession of 
a firearm “shall not be an element of the crime,” but rather “shall be determined 
at sentencing . . . by a preponderance of the evidence.” 477 U.S. 79, 81 n.1 (1986) 
(citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712(b) (1982)).  
 132. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 
United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 
(1909)).  
 133. Id. at 251.  
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Therefore, the Court should have read subsection (b)(2) as a 
separate offense, rather than a sentencing factor.134  
In order to illustrate this “constitutional doubt,” the dissent 
pointed to a string of relevant case law addressing the extent to 
which the Constitution prohibits the reallocation of burdens of 
proof in criminal cases.135 Paying special attention to the Court’s 
most recent case, McMillan v. Pennsylvania,136 the dissent 
emphasized the distinction between statutes that enhance the 
permissible maximum penalty and statutes that prescribe a 
minimum sentence.137 The dissent reasoned that the 
Pennsylvania law in McMillan fell within constitutional limits 
because it did not heighten the maximum penalty for the crime 
committed; rather, it functioned solely to keep the court’s penalty 
within the range already available.138 The Court in McMillan 
specifically recognized, however, that the outcome may have been 
different if the statute had triggered an increase in the maximum 
penalty.139 While the majority maintained that this distinction 
actually strengthens the constitutionality of § 1326 “because an 
increase of the minimum sentence (rather than the permissible 
maximum) is more disadvantageous to the defendant,”140 the 
dissent summarily replied that the McMillan Court not only 
rejected this position, but also based its holding on the “converse” 
                                                                                                     
 134. See id. at 249 (concluding that subsection (b)(2) is a separate offense 
that includes the violation in subsection (a) but adds the element of prior felony 
conviction).  
 135. See id. at 251–58 (discussing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); 
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 
(1977); and McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)). 
 136. See id. at 256 (“[N]o one can read McMillan, our latest opinion on the 
point, without perceiving that the determinative element in our validation of the 
Pennsylvania statute was the fact that it merely limited the sentencing judge’s 
discretion within the range of penalty already available, rather than 
substantially increasing the available sentence.”). 
 137. See id. at 253 (noting that McMillan did not involve an increase of the 
maximum penalty such as the statute in Almendarez-Torres).  
 138. See id. (referencing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87–88). 
 139. See id. (reiterating the McMillan Court’s suggestion that the argument 
for a separate element would have had “at least more superficial appeal” if the 
factor in question, visible possession of a firearm, exposed the defendants to a 
heightened punishment (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88)).  
 140. Id. at 254. 
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conclusion.141 Moreover, the dissent provided a list of cases in 
which state supreme courts determined that a prior conviction 
increasing the charged crime’s maximum punishment must be 
considered an element of the offense.142 
The dissent next addressed the majority’s discussion of the 
tradition of recidivism, noting that it was “near uniform practice” 
among states to treat prior convictions as elements of a separate 
offense when the statute in question creates a greater maximum 
sentence for crimes committed by convicted felons.143 The dissent 
further stressed that the Court’s special treatment of recidivism 
not only lacked a rational basis, but also transgressed the limits 
of common law.144 Listing a host of cases in support, the dissent 
emphasized that under common law, the fact of prior convictions 
must be charged in the same indictment as the underlying crime 
and submitted to the jury for determination.145 The dissent also 
discussed, albeit more briefly, the majority’s textual misreading 
of § 1326 and the statute’s legislative history. The dissent argued 
that the statute in its current form actually undermined the 
majority’s interpretation—why would the legislature eliminate 
the statute’s decisive language (“shall be guilty of a felony”) 
                                                                                                     
 141. Id. 
 142. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 106 N.W. 187, 188 (1906) (“By the uniform 
current of authority, the fact of the prior convictions is to be taken as part of the 
offense instantly charged, at least to the extent of aggravating it and 
authorizing an increased punishment.”); Tuttle v. Commonwealth, 68 Mass. 505, 
506 (1854) (concluding that a prior conviction increasing the maximum sentence 
must be set forth in the indictment). 
 143. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 261 (Scalia, J., dissenting). “While 
several states later altered this procedure by providing a separate proceeding 
for the determination of prior convictions, at least as late as 1965 all but eight 
retained the defendant’s right to a jury determination on this issue.” Id. 
 144. See id. (stating that the majority mistakes the issue in this case for 
whether a prior felony conviction is typically used as a sentencing factor).  
 145. See id. (referencing, for example, Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563 
(1967) and Massey v. United States, 281 F. 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1922), and 
questioning why the majority was unable to find any statutes making recidivism 
an element of the crime); Brent E. Newton, Almendarez-Torres and the Anders 
Ethical Dilemma, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 747, 771 (2008) (noting that, although the 
Court had never directly addressed the issue set forth in Almendarez-Torres, the 
Court had previously resolved similar questions in favor of the defendants when 
a disputed fact increased the maximum punishment).  
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classifying subsection (a) as a crime, if not to make both 
subsections parallel?146  
Finally, the dissent addressed the majority’s “inherent 
unfairness argument” regarding the prejudice of prior 
convictions.147 While it would certainly be unfair to reveal the 
existence of prior felony convictions to the jury, it would be 
equally, if not more, unfair to take away the defendant’s right to 
a jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt on the question 
of prior conviction.148 Looking at the congressional intent, the 
dissent stressed that Congress more likely agreed with the 
traditional practice of the aforementioned common law rather 
than with current policy judgments regarding prejudice when 
drafting this statute.149 Regardless of Congress’s intent, the 
dissent maintained that the very notion that “jury infection” 
trumps the defendant’s right to a jury verdict secured by a 
reasonable-doubt standard is unsound.150  
While Justice Scalia never definitively declared that the 
Constitution requires a jury to find the existence of a prior 
                                                                                                     
 146. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 264 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
[B]oth subsections say that the individuals they describe “shall be 
fined under title 18, or imprisoned not more than [2, 10, or 20] years.” 
If this suffices to define a substantive offense in subsection (a) (as all 
agree it does), it is hard to see why it would not define a substantive 
offense in each paragraph of subsection (b) as well. 
Id. 
 147. See id. at 267 (describing the prejudice of bringing the existence of a 
prior felony conviction to the jury). 
 148. See id. (stating that the majority incorrectly assessed the risk of 
prejudice as the greater disadvantage).  
 149. See id. at 267–68 (noting that the majority’s preference for judicial fact-
finding of prior convictions conflicts with “the manner in which recidivism laws 
have historically been treated in this country”); see, e.g., United States v. Texas, 
507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (discussing the longstanding principle that when 
statutes violate the common law, they must be read with “a presumption 
favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles”); Norfolk 
Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va., 464 
U.S. 30, 34–35 (1983) (concluding that the Uniform Relocation Act did not 
change the “long-established common law principle” that a utility forced to 
relocate from a public right-of-way must cover its own expenses).  
 150. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 268 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the majority’s assertion relies on the assumption that the fact of prior 
convictions is rarely contested, which is inaccurate, according to the dissent, 
especially in the case of an illegal reentry alien statute).  
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conviction, he made clear the constitutional doubt surrounding 
the majority’s exception to such a rule151: “I think it beyond 
question that there was, until today’s unnecessary resolution of 
the point, ‘serious doubt’ whether the Constitution permits a 
defendant’s sentencing exposure to be increased tenfold on the 
basis of a fact that is not charged, tried to a jury, and found 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”152 Only one year after the holding 
in Almendarez-Torres, the dissent’s concerns would begin to 
take shape in the form of an emerging constitutional rule, first 
foreshadowed by Jones v. United States,153 and later solidified 
by Apprendi v. New Jersey.  
C. Apprendi v. New Jersey and Its Revival of Jury Fact-finding  
In Jones v. United States, the Court construed the 
provisions of a federal carjacking statute154 that established 
higher penalties for the offense if it resulted in death or serious 
bodily injury as elements of the offense rather than sentencing 
factors.155 The Court overturned the defendant’s sentence of 
twenty-five years, which had been enhanced from a maximum 
of fifteen years after the district court found, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that serious bodily injury 
resulted from the defendant’s crime.156 This holding marked 
the beginning of a crucial shift in sentencing jurisprudence.157 
                                                                                                     
 151. See id. at 260 (“I do not endorse that position as necessarily correct . . . . 
What I have tried to establish . . . is that on the basis of our jurisprudence to 
date, the answer to the constitutional question is not clear.”). 
 152. Id.  
 153. 526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
 154. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2012). 
 155. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 227 (holding that § 2119 establishes three 
separate offenses, each of which must be charged by indictment, proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury); DEMLEITNER ET AL., supra note 63, 
at 464 (suggesting that § 2119 created separate crimes because “several related 
subsections defined increasing maximum penalty levels if the offense resulted in 
serious bodily injury”).  
 156. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 251–52 (stating that affirming the enhanced 
maximum sentence would “raise serious constitutional questions on which 
precedent is not dispositive”).  
 157. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS, III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
1295 (5th ed. 2013) (noting that the Court’s dictum in Jones would evolve into a 
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A “mirror image”158 of Almendarez-Torres, the majority in Jones 
evaluated a similar federal statute but arrived at the opposite 
conclusion, “recast[ing] what looked like a sentencing factor into 
a traditional element of an offense.”159 While the Court in Jones 
insisted that it was merely interpreting a federal statute, not 
proposing a constitutional rule,160 it undoubtedly foreshadowed 
an emerging principle that would consume the Court’s attention 
during the next decade-long wave of sentencing reform.161  
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court solidified the shift away 
from judicial fact-finding foreshadowed in Jones by taking what 
was a mere footnote162 and setting forth a pivotal constitutional 
rule that would forever change the country’s sentencing 
system.163 The Court addressed a New Jersey “hate crime” 
statute prescribing a greater term of imprisonment for any crime 
when the trial judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
                                                                                                     
“constitutional holding” in Apprendi). 
 158. Bibas, supra note 3, at 1115. 
 159. DEMLEITNER, supra note 63, at 464.  
Four members of the Almendarez-Torres majority repeated their 
arguments in dissent in Jones. They wanted to defer to legislatures, 
stressed traditional leeway for judicial fact-finding at sentencing, and 
forecast that the elements rule would cause grave practical problems. 
Conversely, the Jones majority copied the Almendarez-Torres dissent. 
These Justices distrusted legislatures and judges, exalted juries, 
relied on traditions of jury fact-finding, and adopted a strong rule of 
construction to avoid constitutional doubts. 
Bibas, supra note 3, at 1115.  
 160. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 252 n.11 (claiming that the holding does not set 
forth any new principle of constitutional law, but rather construes a federal 
statute “in light of a set of constitutional concerns that have emerged through a 
series of our decisions over the past quarter century”).  
 161. See id. at 243 n.6 (“[A]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) that 
increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Because our prior 
cases suggest rather than establish this principle, our concern . . . rises only to 
the level of doubt, not certainty.”); DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 157, at 1294 
(suggesting that the holding in Jones would have been far less instrumental had 
the Court not introduced the aforementioned constitutional principle).  
 162. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (quoting footnote 6 of the 
Jones opinion).  
 163. See R. Craig Green, Apprendi’s Limits, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1155, 1157 
(2005) (describing Apprendi v. New Jersey as a “landmark” decision in modern 
sentencing law); Bibas, supra note 3, at 1122 (stating that “Apprendi is Jones 
taken to its logical conclusion”). 
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that the defendant “acted with a purpose to intimidate an 
individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, 
handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity” while 
committing the crime.164 After determining that Apprendi, who 
had been charged with second-degree possession of a firearm for 
an unlawful purpose, violated the state’s hate crime statute, the 
trial court increased the original sentence of ten years (for the 
underlying offense) to twenty years.165 In a predictable 5–4 
split,166 the Court held that “[t]he Constitution requires that any 
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, 
must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”167 Professor Stephanos Bibas perfectly describes the 
majority’s core reasoning in the following way: “The majority once 
again exalted jury fact-finding, relied heavily on historical 
arguments about juries’ traditional role, and refused to trust 
judges or legislators. The Court feared the erosion of jury trials 
and also hinted at the need to give fair notice to defendants of 
enhancements.”168 
The majority emphasized that when assessing whether a 
factor is an element of a separate crime (thereby triggering a jury 
determination beyond a reasonable doubt) or merely a sentencing 
enhancement (thereby triggering a judicial determination by a 
preponderance of the evidence), the central issue is not one of 
form, but rather one of effect: if a “sentencing element” exposes 
the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by 
the jury’s verdict, then that factor should constitute an element of 
a separate offense, regardless of the state’s labeling of that 
factor.169 In establishing this brightline rule, the Court 
                                                                                                     
 164. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44–3(e) (West 1999–2000).  
 165. Apprendi v. United States, 530 U.S. 466, 466 (2000). 
 166. See Gaston, supra note 12, at 1167–68 (noting that the narrow majority 
in Apprendi marked a return to the Framers’ intent that the Sixth Amendment 
should protect individuals from an “over-punitive” government). It is important 
to note that the dissent in Apprendi was comprised of the majority in 
Almendarez-Torres with the exception of Justice Thomas, thereby reflecting a 
shift on the bench towards a revival of the jury’s role in sentencing procedures. 
Id.  
 167. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466 (emphasis added). 
 168. Bibas, supra note 3, at 1122.  
 169. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 (suggesting that labels are not 
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distinguished its holding from McMillan v. Pennsylvania, noting 
that, unlike Apprendi, McMillan did not involve the enhancement 
of a statutory maximum but rather the enhancement of a 
mandatory minimum within a statutory range.170 
One of the most important implications of the Court’s holding 
was that it articulated a seemingly clear exception for prior 
convictions.171 The Court referenced the traditional role of 
recidivism exalted by the Almendarez-Torres majority172 and 
noted that the procedural safeguards attached to a fact of prior 
conviction mitigated any Sixth Amendment concerns.173 However, 
while the majority appeared to uphold the recidivism exception as 
good law, the Apprendi Court ultimately marked the first major 
crack in the Almendarez-Torres foundation, calling into question 
the prior convictions exception and its constitutionality under the 
Sixth Amendment: 
Even though it is arguable that Almendarez-Torres was 
incorrectly decided, and that a logical application of our 
reasoning today should apply if the recidivist issue were 
contested, Apprendi does not contest the decision’s validity 
and we need not revisit it for purposes of our decision today to 
treat the case as a narrow exception to the general rule we 
recalled at the outset. Given its unique facts, it surely does not 
warrant rejection of the otherwise uniform course of decision 
during the entire history of our jurisprudence.174 
                                                                                                     
definitive); McVoy, supra note 57, at 1617 (“If the fact does indeed expose the 
defendant to greater punishment, judicial factfinding is constitutionally 
infirm.”).  
 170. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 486–87 (perpetuating the distinction between 
the enhancement of a mandatory minimum sentence and the enhancement of a 
mandatory maximum sentence).  
 171. See id. at 487 (stating that Almendarez-Torres “represents at best an 
exceptional departure from the historic practice that we have described” 
(emphasis added)).  
 172. See id. at 488 (explaining that “recidivism . . . is a traditional, if not the 
most traditional, basis for a sentencing court’s increasing an offender’s 
sentence” (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 244 
(1998))).  
 173. See id. (noting that Almendarez-Torres did not question the accuracy of 
the fact of his prior conviction).  
 174. Id. at 489–90.  
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Justice Thomas echoed the majority’s doubt in his concurrence.175 
While originally part of the Almendarez-Torres majority, Justice 
Thomas claimed that the Court, including himself, had based too 
much of its justification for the recidivist exception on the fact 
that a prior conviction was traditionally a basis for a heightened 
sentence.176 “What matters is the way by which a fact enters into 
the sentence. If a fact is by law the basis for imposing or 
increasing punishment—for establishing or increasing the 
prosecution’s entitlement—it is an element.”177 Justice Thomas’s 
commentary on Almendarez-Torres was especially significant in 
that it signaled a shift in the Court’s composition of those 
Justices supporting the prior convictions exception and those 
questioning its validity.178  
As was the case in Almendarez-Torres, the dissent in 
Apprendi was equally important in foreshadowing the 
forthcoming issues of the sentencing revolution. The divide 
between the majority and dissent in Apprendi has been described 
as one between “the formalist and the functional”;179 while the 
majority focused on the Founders’ intent to secure the right to a 
jury, the dissent seemed more concerned with the practical issues 
resulting from the Court’s new rule.180 “For one . . . juries may be 
prejudiced just by hearing of enhancements, let alone hearing 
evidence about them. For another, defendants face difficulties 
arguing alternative, inconsistent defenses to juries.”181 The 
                                                                                                     
 175. See id. at 499 (Thomas, J., concurring) (joining the opinion of the Court 
but advocating for a broader constitutional rule).  
 176. See id. (noting that this approach “defines away the real issue”).  
 177. Id. at 521.  
 178. Compare Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226 (1998) 
(joining in the opinion of the Court were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer, and dissenting were Justices Stevens, 
Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg), with Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468 (joining in the 
opinion of the Court were Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and 
Ginsburg, and dissenting were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, 
Kennedy, and Breyer).  
 179. Gaston, supra note 12, at 1172.  
 180. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 550–52 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (suggesting 
that the majority’s new rule has left judges “in a state of limbo”); Bibas, supra 
note 3, at 1123 (claiming that the dissenters were right to worry about the 
compromises to judicial efficiency given the problems this new rule will cause at 
trial and on habeas corpus).  
 181. Bibas, supra note 3, at 1142–43. 
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dissenters also took issue with the majority’s historical analysis, 
emphasizing that legislatures have traditionally had broad 
discretion in defining crimes and punishment, while judges have 
traditionally had broad discretion in sentencing procedures.182 
Arguably one of the most significant criticisms, however, was the 
damage that the Apprendi holding would have on the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines.183 Despite the intention to protect 
defendants from the arbitrary and unbridled discretion of judges, 
the majority’s new rule seemed to invalidate as unconstitutional 
those efforts by Congress and state legislatures to eliminate such 
judicial abuse through the implementation of determinate 
sentencing systems.184 Thus, while the majority opinion did not 
expressly invalidate the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the 
holding seemed to signal an impending demise in the progress of 
determinate sentencing.185 With the sentencing revolution well 
                                                                                                     
 182. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 525–29 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (claiming 
that the majority’s broad rule is unsupported by history and prior decisions of 
the Court); Parese, supra note 63, at 680–81 (emphasizing the importance of 
respecting the will of the legislature and its authority to create procedural 
systems for the administration of justice). The majority’s historical 
interpretation especially attacked the well-established role of judges in capital 
sentencing. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 522–23 (majority opinion) (questioning 
whether the unique nature of capital crimes is sufficient to place such 
sentencing outside the reach of the majority’s new rule in Apprendi). This issue 
took shape in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), when the Court concluded 
that under the holding in Apprendi, “[c]apital defendants, no less than 
noncapital defendants . . . are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on 
which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment.” 
Ring, 536 U.S. at 589. This holding effectively eliminated the “death penalty 
argument” in favor of upholding Almendarez-Torres. See Almendarez-Torres, 
523 U.S. at 247 (supporting the prior convictions exception by referencing a 
judge’s right in capital cases to find those factors underlying the death 
sentence). 
 183. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 544 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (claiming that 
the Court’s holding “invalidate[s] with the stroke of a pen three decades’ worth 
of nationwide reform, all in the name of a principle with a questionable 
constitutional pedigree”). 
 184. See id. at 550–51 (warning that the majority’s implications regarding 
the debatable constitutionality of determinate sentencing would unleash “a flood 
of petitions” from convicted defendants hoping to set aside their sentences); see 
also Bibas, supra note 3, at 1139 (claiming that the majority’s new elements rule 
not only rests on a “premature distrust of legislatures, but also is likely to 
increase arbitrariness by giving prosecutors more power”).  
 185. See Green, supra note 163, at 1161 (stating that the Guidelines could 
survive only if the Court’s logic were limited to statutory maxima); Ford, supra 
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underway, the Court would continue to carve back judicial fact-
finding in the sentencing process over the next several years, 
with each case bolstering the Sixth Amendment jurisprudence 
that was gradually wearing down the Almendarez-Torres 
exception. 
D. Blakely and Booker 
Four years after Apprendi, the dissenters’ fears of sentencing 
disruption became a reality when the Court extended Apprendi’s 
broad rule even further in Blakely v. Washington.186 Blakely pled 
guilty to second-degree kidnapping involving domestic violence 
and use of a firearm, an offense that carried a maximum sentence 
of fifty-three months under Washington’s Sentencing Reform 
Act.187 After determining by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Blakely had acted with “deliberate cruelty,” however, the judge 
departed upward and imposed an exceptional sentence of ninety 
months (thirty-seven months above the state’s guidelines range 
but still below the statutory maximum).188 In a 5–4 decision, the 
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the ninety-month 
sentence violated Blakely’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by 
jury.189 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated that 
Apprendi guarantees this right by ensuring that the judge’s 
sentence is based solely on the facts reflected in the jury verdict 
or admitted to by the defendant, and thus, Washington’s 
sentencing scheme violated the Constitution despite the fact that 
the sentence was within the statutory maximum term of ten 
years for Class B felonies.190 “[T]he relevant ‘statutory maximum’ 
                                                                                                     
note 23, at 20 (“The Apprendi ruling was indeed craftily written to obtain its 
objective, to give the legislature time to begin working on a new system without 
the tumultuous jolt of a Supreme Court ruling which instantaneously overrules 
[the Federal Sentencing Guidelines] and throws the American criminal system 
back thirty years.”).  
 186. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).  
 187. See id. at 299 (referencing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.320 (2000)).  
 188. Id. at 299–300.  
 189. See id. at 306 (noting that Apprendi protects this right by “ensuring 
that the judge’s authority to sentence derives wholly from the jury’s verdict”).  
 190. See id. at 308 (claiming that the Framers’ decision to include a jury 
trial guarantee in the Constitution stemmed from an unwillingness to trust 
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is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding 
additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any 
additional findings.”191 In other words, every defendant has the 
constitutional right to insist that the prosecutor prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt all facts legally essential to the punishment.192  
The dissenters in Blakely, consisting of the same four 
dissenters in Apprendi, strenuously rejected the majority’s 
constitutional argument and stressed the practical consequences 
that the Court’s holding would have on future judicial 
proceedings.193 In the first of three dissenting opinions, Justice 
O’Connor lamented that “over 20 years of sentencing reform 
[were] all but lost, and tens of thousands of criminal judgments 
[were] in jeopardy” as a result of the Court’s holding.194 While the 
majority claimed that its holding did not address the validity of 
the Federal Guidelines,195 the dissenters argued otherwise, 
pointing to the similarities between Washington’s determinate 
sentencing scheme and that of the Guidelines:196 “If the 
Washington scheme does not comport with the Constitution, it is 
hard to imagine a guidelines scheme that would.”197 Considering 
the number of states with sentencing schemes virtually identical 
to Washington’s, the dissenters claimed that the Blakely holding 
would result in severe disorder for the criminal justice system, 
                                                                                                     
government to establish the proper role of the jury).  
 191. Id. at 303–04.  
 192. Id. at 313. “Blakely suggests the Constitutional [sic] does not permit 
judges to find facts which increase applicable sentencing ranges, even though 
nearly all sentencing reforms of the past two decades have made judges central 
and essential fact-finders in the application of sentencing laws.” Douglas A. 
Berman, Examining the Blakely Earthquake and Its Aftershocks, 16 FED. SENT. 
R. 307, 307 (2004). 
 193. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 323–24 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (describing 
the unsettling practical implications of the majority’s holding). 
 194. Id. at 326. Justice O’Connor went as far as to describe the decision as a 
“Number 10 earthquake.” Luna, supra note 43, at 26. 
 195. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305 n.9 (majority opinion) (claiming that 
because the Federal Guidelines are not before the Court, the majority’s holding 
offers no opinion regarding the constitutionality of said scheme).  
 196. See id. at 325 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (claiming that Washington’s 
scheme is almost identical to the upward-departure process established by 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(b)).  
 197. Id. at 326.  
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forcing many states, as well as Congress, to re-examine years of 
sentencing reform.198  
The dissenters further stressed that the majority, by 
implicitly weakening the viability of determinate sentencing 
schemes, actually undermined the very constitutional principles 
it claimed to promote through its holding.199 Justice O’Connor 
argued that because the majority’s broad extension of Apprendi 
would ultimately weaken (or eliminate altogether) determinate 
sentencing schemes, defendants would consequently face a 
criminal justice system without the safeguards of sentence 
uniformity.200 Justice Kennedy further emphasized that the 
majority opinion failed to consider the fundamental principle of 
collaboration, meaning that different branches of government 
must be able to converse and work together on significant issues 
of common interest such as improving the judicial sentencing 
system:201 
Sentencing guidelines are a prime example of this 
collaborative process. Dissatisfied with the wide disparity in 
sentencing, participants in the criminal justice 
system . . . pressed for legislative reforms. In response, 
legislators drew from these participants’ shared experiences 
and enacted measures to correct the problems, which, as 
Justice O’Connor explains, could sometimes rise to the level of 
a constitutional injury.202  
Through its implicit destruction of determinate sentencing, 
Justice Kennedy feared the majority had closed a necessary 
vehicle for dialogue between the different branches of 
                                                                                                     
 198. See McVoy, supra note 57, at 1613 (claiming that Blakely “wreaked 
havoc” on established sentencing schemes within the course of just a few 
months, requiring trial judges, prosecutors, and legislators across the country to 
face the practical realities of a legal system with a rapidly increasing role for the 
jury). 
 199. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 339 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (claiming, for 
example, that judges would be unable to base sentencing on real conduct while 
also maintaining uniformity under the majority’s holding).  
 200. See id. at 314 (predicting that the majority’s holding would ultimately 
result in a consolidation of sentencing power in the state and federal 
judiciaries).  
 201. Id. at 326 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
 202. Id. at 327.  
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government, thereby weakening the fairness and effectiveness of 
the criminal justice system.203  
As predicted, the Blakely holding created a great deal of 
confusion regarding the application of determinate sentencing 
schemes; while state legislatures and sentencing commissions 
were busy gauging the impact of Blakely on their own sentencing 
guidelines, judges too were in a state of limbo, preparing for the 
inevitable litany of appeals from those already-sentenced 
defendants.204 Within several months of the Blakely decision, the 
Court addressed this confusion by consolidating two federal 
cases, United States v. Booker205 and United States v. Fanfan,206 
and determining whether the imposition of an enhanced sentence 
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth 
Amendment.207 Justice Stevens authored the first part of the 
Court’s opinion and was joined by the same majority in Apprendi 
and Blakely (Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg).208 
The Court held that the Sixth Amendment as construed in 
Blakely did in fact apply to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
and that by imposing an enhanced sentence based on a 
sentencing judge’s determination of a fact not found by the jury 
nor admitted to by the defendant, the Guidelines violated the 
Constitution.209 The Court primarily based its decision on the 
                                                                                                     
 203. See id. at 345  
[T]he fairness and effectiveness of a sentencing system, and the 
related fairness and effectiveness of the criminal justice system itself, 
depend upon the legislature’s possessing the constitutional authority 
(within due process limits) to make that labeling decision. To restrict 
radically the legislature’s power in this respect, as the majority 
interprets the Sixth Amendment to do, prevents the legislature from 
seeking sentencing systems that are consistent with, and indeed may 
help to advance, the Constitution’s greater fairness goals. 
 204. See DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 157, at 1323 (describing Blakely’s 
aftermath as “electric”).  
 205. 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 542 U.S. 956 (2004). 
 206. No. 03-47, 2004 WL 1723114 (D.Me. 2004), cert. granted, 542 U.S. 956 
(2004). 
 207. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005) (plurality opinion 
Part I) (noting that both cases involved the issue of whether application of the 
Federal Guidelines violated defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights).  
 208. See id. at 225 (listing the division of votes amongst the Justices).  
 209. See id. at 221 (noting that there was no constitutionally significant 
distinction between the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Washington 
procedure at issue in Blakely).  
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Guidelines’ mandatory nature, noting that if the provisions were 
advisory and merely recommended—rather than required—
particular sentences, the application of the Guidelines would not 
violate the Sixth Amendment jury trial right.210 When a judge 
finds a fact by a preponderance of the evidence that automatically 
enhances the defendant’s sentence, however, the defendant 
consequently loses his right to a jury determination of those facts 
deemed relevant by the judge.211 Justice Stevens also preempted 
the practical concerns repeatedly expressed by the dissenters, 
noting that while “jury factfinding may impair the most 
expedient and efficient sentencing of defendants . . . the interest 
in fairness and reliability protected by the right to a jury 
trial . . . now enshrined in the Sixth Amendment—has always 
outweighed the interest in concluding trials swiftly.”212 
The second part of the Court’s opinion, authored by Justice 
Breyer and joined by the three dissenters to Justice Stevens’s 
opinion (in addition to Justice Ginsburg), sought to remedy the 
alleged conflict between the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and 
the Sixth Amendment with a compromise: rather than 
invalidating the Guidelines as a whole, Justice Breyer’s opinion 
announced that the Court would strike down 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(b)(1),213 which made the Guidelines mandatory and 
therefore incompatible with the constitutional protections exalted 
by Justice Stevens.214 The Court also severed 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(e),215 which established a de novo standard of appellate 
review and was based on the mandatory nature of the 
Guidelines.216 By striking these provisions, the Court recast the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines as an “advisory” system, allowing 
                                                                                                     
 210. See id. (referencing the language of the Guidelines, for example use of 
the word “shall,” as evidence of the system’s mandatory nature).  
 211. See id. at 233 (suggesting that the Guidelines would be permissible 
under the Sixth Amendment had Congress not made the Guidelines binding on 
district judges).  
 212. Id. at 243–44.  
 213. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (repealed 2005).   
 214. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 259 (plurality opinion Part II) (stating that 
§ 3553(b)(1) is a necessary condition of the constitutional violation).  
 215.  18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (repealed 2005).  
 216. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 259 (plurality opinion Part II)  (concluding that 
without the aforementioned provisions, the remainder of the Act satisfies the 
Court’s constitutional requirements).  
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judges to continue making the factual findings necessary for 
increased sentences, but no longer in a way that would run afoul 
of Blakely and Booker.217 Thus, while still required to consult the 
Guidelines’ ranges during sentencing proceedings, judges were no 
longer bound to their application.218  
E. Alleyne v. United States: The Final Nail in the Coffin? 
In the years following Blakely and Booker, courts and 
legislatures attempted to navigate the concept of advisory 
sentencing and adjust to the increasingly significant jury role 
established by the Apprendi revolution.219 On June 17, 2013, 
Alleyne v. United States marked what many would consider the 
final nail in the coffin for judicial fact-finding in sentencing.220 
Alleyne was convicted of robbery affecting commerce and use of a 
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence.221 While the 
offense of using or carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of 
violence carries a mandatory minimum sentence of five years, the 
judge raised the minimum term to seven years under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)222 after determining by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Alleyne had “brandished” the firearm.223 Alleyne 
appealed, claiming that the jury did not find the fact of 
“brandishing” beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore the 
                                                                                                     
 217. See id. at 264–65 (claiming that by making the Guidelines advisory, the 
sentencing system is still in keeping with Congress’s goal of avoiding excessive 
sentencing disparities while maintaining the flexibility needed to individualize 
sentences). 
 218. See Darmer, supra note 40, at 560 (suggesting that the lack of 
mandatory application allows the revised sentencing system to avoid 
constitutional conflicts).  
 219. See, e.g., Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 338 (2007) (determining 
that a court of appeal may presume that a sentence imposed within the proper 
Federal Guidelines range is reasonable, although the presumption of 
reasonableness is not binding).  
 220. See Gottlieb, supra note 18 (discussing the importance of Alleyne in the 
context of the Apprendi line of cases).  
 221. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2152 (2013) (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1)(A) (2012)).  
 222. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).  
 223. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2152 (referencing § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), which 
increases the sentence to a mandatory minimum of seven years upon a finding 
that the offender brandished the firearm). 
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judge’s decision to raise the mandatory minimum sentence based 
on that fact violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.224 
In yet another 5–4 split, the Court held that “because 
mandatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime, 
any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an ‘element’ 
that must be submitted to the jury.”225 In vacating Alleyne’s 
sentence as violative of the Sixth Amendment, the Court 
overruled the previously held distinction between enhancements 
that increase a mandatory minimum and enhancements that 
increase a mandatory maximum, the latter of which was 
addressed in Apprendi.226 The majority concluded that the 
holding in Apprendi applied with equal force to facts increasing 
the mandatory minimum because a fact that triggers such an 
increase likewise alters the prescribed range of penalties: “[A] 
fact increasing either end of the range produces a new penalty 
and constitutes an ingredient of the offense. It is impossible to 
dissociate the floor of a sentencing range from the penalty affixed 
to the crime.”227 The majority claimed that the “essential Sixth 
Amendment inquiry” is whether a fact is an element of the crime; 
in the instant case, the finding of “brandishing” aggravated the 
range of possible punishment, and thereby constituted an 
element of a separate, aggravated offense that must be found by 
the jury.228 Thus, the Alleyne Court brought the Apprendi 
revolution to its logical end, establishing that any fact, whether it 
increases the mandatory minimum sentence or the mandatory 
maximum, is an element of the crime rather than a sentencing 
factor and must be submitted to the jury to be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.229  
                                                                                                     
 224. See id. (noting that the verdict form made no indication that the jury 
found the fact of  brandishing).  
 225. Id. at 2513.  
 226. See id. (overruling Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), which 
sustained a judge’s ability to increase the mandatory minimum sentence, 
though not beyond the statutory maximum).  
 227. Id.  
 228. See id. at 2161 (asserting that it is “impossible to dispute that the facts 
increasing the legally prescribed floor aggravate the punishment, heightening 
the loss of liberty associated with the crime”).  
 229. See id. at 2163 (claiming that there is no basis to distinguish facts that 
raise the maximum sentence from those that raise the minimum); see also 
Gottlieb, supra note 18 (noting that facts that alter both “ceilings” and “floors” 
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IV. The Continuing Viability of the Almendarez-Torres Exception 
Under Alleyne 
By returning judicial fact-finding to the hands of the jury and 
solidifying a decade’s worth of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, 
the holding in Alleyne seemed to mark the end of a sentencing 
era.230 However, the case left one major question unanswered: 
what about prior convictions? The Alleyne Court made clear that 
any facts contributing to the penalty range of a crime must be 
proven to the jury.231 Thus, one might conclude that the fact of a 
prior conviction falls within that category as well. Interestingly, 
the Court refused to address whether the Alleyne rule 
encompassed the previously carved-out exception in Almendarez-
Torres: “In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, we recognized a 
narrow exception to this general rule for the fact of a prior 
conviction. Because the parties do not contest that decision’s 
vitality, we do not revisit it for purposes of our decision today.”232  
Lower courts have continued to uphold Almendarez-Torres as 
good law despite its questionable viability under the holding in 
Alleyne.233 “Though wounded, Almendarez-Torres still marches on 
                                                                                                     
have the potential to increase a defendant’s punishment above that which a 
judge might have imposed).  
 230. See Gottlieb, supra note 18 (suggesting that Alleyne provided strong 
support and consistency to the pro-Apprendi Court’s Sixth Amendment 
sentencing saga).  
 231. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2153 (referencing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).  
 232. Id. at 2160 n.1.  
 233. See United States v. Harris, No. 12-14482, 2014 WL 292381, at *8–9 
(11th Cir. Jan. 28, 2014) (citing United States v. Thomas, 242 F.3d 1029, 1035 
(11th Cir. 2001)).  
We recognize that there is some tension between Almendarez-Torres 
on the one hand and Alleyne and Apprendi on the other. However, we 
are not free to do what the Supreme Court declined to do in Alleyne, 
which is overrule Almendarez-Torres. As we have said before, we are 
“bound to follow Almendarez-Torres unless and until the Supreme 
Court itself overrules that decision.” 
Id. See generally United States v. Abrahamson, No. 11-2404, 2013 WL 4780090 
(8th Cir. Sept. 9, 2013); United States v. Mack, No. 12-5451, 2013 WL 4767176 
(6th Cir. Sept. 6, 2013); United States v. Converson, No. 12-30291, 2013 WL 
4473187 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2013); United States v. Flowers, No. 12-14930, 2013 
WL 4046024 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2013); United States v. Rivera, No. 12-2116, 
2013 WL 3852725 (3d Cir. July 26, 2013); United States v. Carrigan, 724 F.3d 
39 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Wiggan, No. 12-2393-cr, 2013 WL 3766535 
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and we are ordered to follow. We will join the funeral procession 
only after the Supreme Court has decided to bury it.”234 This has 
not deterred defendants from raising the issue for later review, 
however; in federal circuit courts alone, over 5,200 federal 
defendants have filed appeals requesting that Almendarez-Torres 
be overruled.235 Given the obvious tension surrounding 
Almendarez-Torres and its purported “erosion” by Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence, it seems likely that the Court will 
eventually need to address the issue of whether the prior 
convictions exception still stands under the recent holding in 
Alleyne.236 Despite those defendants, prosecutors, and even 
certain Justices who argue that Almendarez-Torres is no longer 
viable, this Note argues that the Court should ultimately sustain 
the prior convictions exception, leave Almendarez-Torres intact, 
and establish, with finality, that judges are the correct 
adjudicatory body to determine findings of prior convictions in the 
sentencing process.  
A. The Constitutional Implications of Almendarez-Torres  
Before examining the practical implications of Almendarez-
Torres, it is important to recognize that the prior convictions 
exception is arguably sustainable on constitutional grounds 
alone. While the Sixth Amendment grants criminal defendants 
the right to a trial by jury, the Constitution fails to specify the 
role of “nonjury actors” at sentencing after the jury announces a 
verdict of guilt.237 The most basic answer to this question is one of 
                                                                                                     
(2d Cir. July 19, 2013); United States v. Croft, No. 12-4890, 2013 WL 3615944 
(4th Cir. July 16, 2013). 
 234. Newton, supra note 145, at 785–86 (citing United States v. Gibson, 434 
F.3d 1234, 1247 (11th Cir. 2006)).  
 235. Id. at 805. 
 236. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27–28 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“[I]n an appropriate case, this Court should consider Almendarez-
Torres’ continuing viability.”). 
 237. Green, supra note 163, at 1155 (internal citations omitted); see Darmer, 
supra note 40, at 579 (“[B]road sentencing discretion was a concept unknown to 
the Framers; they never had to consider the constitutional implications of a 
choice between ‘submitting every fact that increases a sentence to the jury or 
vesting the sentencing judge with broad discretionary authority to account for 
differences in offense and offenders.’”).  
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categorization: the Sixth Amendment guarantee turns on 
whether “a fact is an element of the crime.”238 In other words, the 
jury trial protections of the Sixth Amendment require that the 
jury find beyond a reasonable doubt only the elements of the 
crime as defined by the legislature.239 Thus, the most 
straightforward reading of the Constitution dictates that after 
finding the elements of the crime and rendering a verdict, the 
jury’s role is complete pursuant to the Sixth Amendment.240 Any 
prior convictions subsequently found by the judge solely affect the 
defendant’s sentence, not his innocence or guilt for the crime with 
which he is charged.241 As Justice Breyer writes in his 
concurrence in Alleyne, the Court’s reasoning in Apprendi was 
flawed in that it failed to appreciate this consistently held 
distinction between elements of a crime (facts constituting the 
crime for the jury to determine) and sentencing facts (facts 
affecting the sentence for the judge to determine).242 The Sixth 
Amendment’s jury trial guarantee does not traditionally include 
those facts solely affecting the defendant’s sentence;243 therefore, 
prior convictions do not logically fall within the category of 
offense elements and are exempt from the jury trial requirements 
of the Sixth Amendment.244 
                                                                                                     
 238. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2153 (2013); see also 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 500 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(stating that Sixth Amendment constitutional protections turn on the 
determination of which facts constitute “ingredients” of the crime). 
 239. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 664 (1970) (holding that the jury trial 
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment gives a criminal defendant the right to 
demand that a jury find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of “every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged”).  
 240. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2169 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that the 
jury’s role was discharged after rendering the verdict and providing the judge 
with the appropriate range for sentencing). 
 241. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 244 (1998) 
(explaining that recidivism does not relate to the commission of the offense). 
 242. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2166–67 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 243. See id. (noting that the early historical references set forth by the Court 
in favor of Apprendi refer to offense elements, not sentencing factors).  
 244. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (limiting the reasonable-doubt standard to 
elements of the crime). But see United States v. Gilliam, 944 F.2d 97, 100 (2d 
Cir. 1993) (noting that prior convictions may be proven during the guilt stage 
when the prior conviction is an actual, statutorily defined element of the crime 
charged, for example, a felon in possession of a firearm). 
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This traditional interpretation of the Sixth Amendment is 
well supported by the unique nature of recidivism. As previously 
discussed, our judicial system has consistently viewed recidivism 
as a sentencing factor, not an element of the crime.245 This 
categorization seems especially reasonable given that prior 
convictions represent “the outcome of earlier proceedings in 
which the defendant was afforded procedural safeguards such as 
a trial by jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”246 As a 
result, the categorical distinction between prior convictions and 
offense elements ultimately satisfies the judicial guarantees of 
the Sixth Amendment.  
Over the course of the Apprendi revolution, however, the 
Court has drastically departed from this well-established 
distinction between prior convictions and offense elements and 
adopted a “broad new interpretation” of the Sixth Amendment’s 
scope.247 This overly broad interpretation not only expands the 
jury’s role outside of those responsibilities articulated by the 
Sixth Amendment, but also impedes the legislature’s authority to 
define elements of the crime.248 By restricting the legislature’s 
ability to label certain facts as “sentencing factors” versus 
“elements of the crime,” the Court ultimately prevents the 
                                                                                                     
 245. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (suggesting that the Court 
would be departing from a well-established tradition if it was to consider 
recidivism as an element of the crime, rather than a sentencing factor). 
 246. A. Luria, Traditional Sentencing Factors v. Elements of an Offense: The 
Questionable Viability of Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 1229, 1237 (2005).  
 247. Stephanos Bibas, Blakely’s Federal Aftermath, 16 FED. SENT. R. 333, 
333 (2004).  
 248. The pro-Apprendi Court has generally argued that when a sentencing 
factor enhances a prescribed sentence, it becomes an element of a separate, 
aggravated offense and therefore falls under the Sixth Amendment guarantee. 
See, e.g., Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2153 (concluding that because the fact of 
brandishing heightens the prescribed sentencing range, it therefore constitutes 
an element of a separate, aggravated offense). This argument, however, fails to 
appreciate the legislature’s authority to distinguish between elements of a crime 
and sentencing factors. Thus, this Note argues that a prior conviction triggers a 
new, separate crime only when the legislature makes the clear decision to 
statutorily define and articulate that fact as an “element” of the crime. See, e.g., 
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85–86 (1986) (suggesting that the 
Pennsylvania Legislature did not include “visible possession” as one of the 
enumerated elements of the crime, and thereby designated “visible possession” 
as a separate sentencing factor). 
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legislature from seeking a sentencing system that is consistent 
with the Constitution’s greater fairness goals.249 When put into 
practice, an absolute jury fact-finding approach would undermine 
constitutional principles central to our judicial system:  
The pre-Apprendi rule of deference to the legislature retains a 
built-in political check to prevent lawmakers from shifting the 
prosecution for crimes to the penalty phase proceedings of 
lesser included and easier-to-prove offenses. . . . There is no 
similar check, however, on application of the majority’s “any 
fact that increases the upper bound of judicial discretion” by 
courts.250 
If the Court were to re-categorize prior convictions as offense 
elements, thereby solidifying a system of absolute jury fact-
finding, it would not only restrict the legislature’s long-held 
responsibility to define the elements of crimes, but also eliminate 
a much-needed political check in our criminal justice system.251 
Thus, when applied in practice, the pro-Apprendi Court’s broad 
Sixth Amendment interpretation generates a host of 
constitutional deficiencies. Given that the categorization of prior 
convictions is already constitutionally sound, it would be 
imprudent to overturn Almendarez-Torres based on such 
unsteady reasoning.252 
However, even in the event that the Court re-labels 
recidivism as an element of the crime, the aforementioned 
procedural safeguards attached to prior convictions ensure the 
reliability and constitutionality of such facts, thereby eliminating 
                                                                                                     
 249. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 345–46 (2004) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“[There are concerns] about the obstacles the Court’s decision poses 
to legislative efforts to bring about greater uniformity between real criminal 
conduct and real punishment; and ultimately about the limitations that the 
Court imposes upon legislatures’ ability to make democratic legislative 
decisions.”). 
 250. Id. at 322 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 251. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 225 (1998) 
(suggesting that a legislature’s decision to categorize recidivism as a sentencing 
factor is within the constitutional limits of the legislature’s authority to define 
offense elements).  
 252. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2166–67 (Breyer, J., concurring) (suggesting 
that Apprendi was wrongly decided); Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 
295 (2007) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that the Apprendi line of cases is 
incorrect).  
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the need for a jury determination.253 Justice Thomas 
acknowledged this consideration in Rangel-Reyes v. United 
States,254 conceding that the judicial determination of a 
defendant’s prior criminal history “will seldom create any 
significant risk of prejudice to the accused” and that there is 
ultimately no “special justification” for overruling Almendarez-
Torres.255 
B. Imagining a Sentencing System Without Almendarez-Torres  
The constitutional argument in favor of prior convictions is 
admittedly problematic, so imagine for argument’s sake, that 
Almendarez-Torres truly is unconstitutional and that by allowing 
judges to determine prior convictions, the judicial system in some 
way violates defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights. Even under 
this presumption, the Court should still leave Almendarez-Torres 
intact. While absolute jury fact-finding may be an admirable idea 
in theory, actual implementation of this system would be far 
more than “a modest inconvenience” to our criminal justice 
system.256 As Dean Nora Demleitner of Washington and Lee 
University School of Law has discussed, many scholars believe 
that the judicial system should adhere to a rigid and unyielding 
interpretation of the Constitution, no matter what the cost.257 
Unfortunately, this goal, however noble, is not only impractical, 
but also dangerously crippling to the functioning of a successful, 
expedient criminal justice system. The decision to overturn 
                                                                                                     
 253. See Garrus v. Sec’y of Pa. Dept. of Corrections, 694 F.3d 394, 400 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (stating that a prior conviction has already been established through 
procedural safeguards, such as fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial 
guarantees (referencing Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999))). 
 254. 547 U.S. 1200 (2006). 
 255. See id. at 1201 (denying certiorari). Justice Thomas also acknowledged 
that countless judges have relied on Almendarez-Torres in making sentencing 
determinations and thus, “the doctrine of stare decisis provides a sufficient 
basis” for upholding Almendarez-Torres in future cases. Id.  
 256. Darmer, supra note 40, at 551–52.  
 257. See DEMLEITNER ET AL., supra note 63, at 466 (“Let justice be done 
though the heavens fall.” (quoting a Roman maxim)).  
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Almendarez-Torres would ultimately ignore “the compromises 
needed for the judicial system to function.”258 
1. Habitual-Offender Statutes 
If the Court decided to overrule Almendarez-Torres, thereby 
requiring a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt the fact of any 
prior conviction, the judicial system would have two basic options 
in implementing a post-Almendarez-Torres sentencing system. 
The first option would be to require the prosecution to plead and 
prove prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt during the 
guilt stage. This type of system would likely resemble a concept 
similar to California’s “Three Strikes” scheme—in other words, a 
system of anti-recidivist laws that increase the punishment for 
repeat offenders.259 Almost all states have enacted some type of 
habitual-offender statute.260 Under these anti-recidivist schemes, 
the prosecution must typically plead and prove all known prior 
convictions at trial beyond a reasonable doubt.261 Challenges to 
such prior convictions are permissible as collateral attacks on the 
grounds of “violation of constitutional right to jury trial, 
                                                                                                     
 258. See Gaston, supra note 12, at 1172 (describing the split between 
proponents and opponents of Almendarez-Torres as a divide of formalists and 
functionalists, and describing the pro-Apprendi majority’s view as somewhat 
more idealistic, despite potential inefficiency). 
 259. See DEMLEITNER ET AL., supra note 63, at 368 (explaining that under 
California’s “three strikes and you’re out” policy, many types of prior convictions 
qualify as “serious” or “violent,” and thus constitute a “strike”). A third felony 
will result in a sentence of at least twenty-five years. Id. Some recidivists may 
even receive twice the normal sentence for the current felony conviction 
depending on their prior convictions. See Erik G. Luna, Three Strikes in a 
Nutshell, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 1–3, 10 (1998) (referencing CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 667(e)(1)).  
 260.  See DEMLEITNER ET AL., supra note 63, at 368 (describing California’s 
“Three Strikes” law as the most severe in the country). Under federal law, the 
habitual offender statute falls under 18 U.S.C. § 3559, which mandates that a 
person who is convicted of a serious violent felony shall be sentenced to life 
imprisonment if the person has been convicted on separate prior occasions of 
two or more serious violent felonies or one or more serious violent felonies and 
one or more serious drug offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1) (2012).  
 261. See, e.g., CAL. PRAC. GUIDE THREE STRIKES SENTENCING § 4:1 (stating 
that the prior convictions must be pled and proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
before the Three Strikes law is triggered).  
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confrontation, and against self-incrimination.”262 Herein lies one 
of the inescapable criticisms surrounding habitual-offender 
systems and consequently, one of the primary reasons to uphold 
Almendarez-Torres—prejudice to the defendant.  
“Rules of evidence have been written to confine trials to 
evidence that is strictly relevant to the particular offense 
charged. The rationale . . . is not only to ‘prevent a time 
consuming and confusing trial of collateral issues,’ but also to 
prevent juries from being prejudiced by inflammatory facts.”263 
Unlike other sentencing factors that must be proven to the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the introduction of evidence regarding 
a defendant’s prior convictions will always pose a significant risk 
of prejudice.264 Prior crimes evidence tends to weigh more heavily 
with the jurors and pushes them to “prejudge” the defendant, 
denying him the fair opportunity to defend against the particular 
charge at issue.265 Given the potential for prejudice, it seems 
likely that many defendants would actually oppose exercising 
their right to insist that the prosecution prove prior convictions to 
the jury.266 Moreover, for those defendants who do want to 
challenge their prior convictions in front of the jury, the result 
will likely be “a mini trial” in which the defendant attempts to 
argue constitutional violations that were already addressed at 
                                                                                                     
 262. People v. Sumstine, 687 P.2d 904 (Cal. 1984) (en banc). 
 263. Parese, supra note 63, at 685 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 
241, 246–47 (1949)).  
 264. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 38 (2005) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (noting that “whatever the merits of the Apprendi doctrine, that 
doctrine . . . should not be extended to bear on, determinations of a defendant’s 
past crimes . . . .”).  
 265. See United States v. Harris, 332 F. Supp. 2d 692, 706 (D.N.J. 2004) 
(referencing Michaelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948)).  
 266. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 824 A.2d 123, 123 (Md. 2003) (noting that the 
defendant was far more willing to stipulate as to his prior conviction, rather 
than allow the jury to hear evidence regarding the name and nature of said 
conviction); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on 
Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to 
Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1361 (2009) 
(summarizing previous studies that found that jurors use similar criminal 
record information to develop “propensity judgments” and other “negative 
evaluations” of a defendant).  
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the previous trial,267 thereby expending an unnecessary amount 
of the court’s time and resources. 
While defendants can minimize the prejudice of their prior 
convictions through stipulation,268 the prosecution is entitled, 
under most circumstances, to prove its case as it sees fit;269 aside 
from violent felonies, the prosecution is typically free to reject a 
defendant’s proposed stipulations.270 In an attempt to address 
this issue of prejudice, some states have instituted “partial guilty 
pleas,” which allow defendants to plead guilty to the prior 
conviction, but go to trial for the remaining elements of the 
charge.271 These systems, however, are not without fault. Not 
only are partial guilty pleas less appealing to the Government,272 
they also provide prosecutors with an unfair bargaining chip in 
those states that require prosecutors’ consent.273 Thus, there are 
few effective mechanisms to protect defendants against prejudice 
in habitual-offender systems.  
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 268. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187–92 (1997) (holding 
that the prosecution may not, in a felon-in-possession case, present additional 
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 269. See Joseph A. Colquitt, Evidence and Ethics: Litigating in the Shadows 
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holding in Old Chief, which recognized the traditional rule that the prosecution 
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 270. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 183 n.7 (noting that the Court’s holding is 
limited to cases involving proof of felon status); David Robinson Jr., Old Chief, 
Crowder, and Trials by Stipulation, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 311, 338 (1998) 
(recognizing the limitations of the holding in Old Chief).  
 271. See Nancy J. King, Juries and Prior Convictions: Managing the Demise 
of the Prior Conviction Exception to Apprendi 5–7 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. 
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 14-24), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2459682 (describing similar 
systems in Oregon and North Dakota). 
 272. See id. at 6 (noting that prosecutors are unable to present the prior 
conviction to the jury in a single proceeding under a partial guilty plea 
agreement). 
 273. See id. (stating that the option of a partial guilty plea does not 
necessarily mean an unqualified right to plead guilty to the prior conviction). 
For example, Nevada requires that the prosecution agree to the stipulation 
regarding a prior conviction in cases of partial guilty pleas. NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 207.016 (2013). 
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Aside from issues of prejudice, there are also practical 
concerns associated with habitual-offender schemes. For example, 
if the Court overrules Almendarez-Torres and requires that a 
sentencing jury find facts of prior conviction as “elements” of the 
crime, to what extent does the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation 
Clause apply? In Washington v. Crawford,274 the Court barred 
admission of testimonial hearsay during trial unless the witness 
is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine the witness.275 The Court expanded this holding to 
encompass forensic evidence in Bullcoming v. New Mexico,276 
concluding that a defendant has the right to confront the analyst 
who certified his blood-alcohol analysis report (so long as the 
report is testimonial within the meaning of the Confrontation 
Clause).277 So where does this leave proof of prior criminal 
history? Who must testify in regards to these prior convictions? 
In federal court, if prior convictions derive from state cases, must 
the court clerk from that state testify? Who verifies the prior 
convictions to the jury and in what capacity can the defendant 
confront that declarant? These are just some of the 
administrative questions the Court would have to answer if it 
decided to implement a post-Almendarez-Torres system in which 
the prosecution pleads and proves prior offenses during the guilt 
stage. 
2. Sentencing Juries 
If the Court determines that the prejudice resulting from 
pleading and proving prior convictions during the guilt stage is 
too detrimental, it will have to resort to its second option—
implementation of a sentencing jury.278 This type of system 
                                                                                                     
 274. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  
 275. Id. at 36.  
 276. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
 277. Id. at 2707. 
 278. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 319 (2004) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (suggesting that in order to prevent the evidence of prior convictions 
from prejudicing the jury during the guilt determination stage, the Government 
“may have to bear the additional expense of a separate, full-blown jury trial 
during the penalty phase proceeding”); Jenia I. Turner, Implementing Blakely, 
17 FED. SENT. R. 106, 108 (2004) (suggesting that if juries were to determine 
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bifurcates criminal proceedings into a trial stage and a 
sentencing stage, meaning that the same jury that determines 
the defendant’s guilt or innocence also determines facts related to 
the defendant’s punishment.279 However, the jury only hears 
evidence relevant to sentencing after it has rendered its guilty 
verdict so as to avoid any undue prejudice to the defendant.280 In 
fact, such a system may even require that evidence of recidivism 
be presented separately from evidence of other, more benign 
sentencing factors as well.281 While sentencing juries may seem 
like a reasonable solution to a post-Almendarez-Torres sentencing 
system, sentencing juries are actually fairly unusual in today’s 
criminal justice system and a blanket implementation of such 
bifurcation would mark a radical decision for the Court.282 
Ultimately, the issues associated with sentencing juries outweigh 
whatever constitutional benefits or principles would result from 
overturning Almendarez-Torres.  
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice have long called for 
the abolition of jury sentencing in noncapital cases: “Imposition of 
sentences is a judicial function to be performed by sentencing 
courts. The function of sentencing courts is to impose a sentence 
upon each offender that is appropriate to the offense and the 
offender. The jury’s role in a criminal trial should not extend to 
determination of the appropriate sentence.”283 One of the main 
justifications for excluding the jury from the sentencing process is 
the potential for bias and inconsistency, two issues the Federal 
                                                                                                     
prior convictions, bifurcation of the process would be inevitable).  
 279. See Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 311, 334–35 (2003) (explaining the bifurcation process).  
 280. See id. (describing some of the purposes behind the implementation of 
sentencing juries, mainly the avoidance of prejudice from evidence of prior 
convictions).  
 281. See King, supra note 271, at 9 n.3 (referencing Greer v. Commonwealth, 
No. 2008-SC-000847-MR, 2010 WL 2471842 (Ky. June 17, 2010), in which the 
trial was trifurcated: the first phase was the guilt phase for assault and 
endangerment charges, the second phase was the guilt phase for the persistent 
felony offender charge, and the final phase was sentencing). 
 282. See DEMLEITNER ET AL., supra note 63, at 102 (noting that only a half-
dozen states allow juries to determine the offender’s sentence: Virginia, 
Kentucky, Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, and Oklahoma). 
 283. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SENTENCING 18-1.4 (3d ed. 
1994).  
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Guidelines sought to remedy.284 As evidenced by several major 
studies regarding the disparities resulting from sentencing juries, 
different juries lead to different sentences.285 In one study, an 
anonymous poll of juror sentence recommendations demonstrated 
that the median recommendation was only 19% of the median 
range in the relevant sentencing guidelines.286 Interestingly, 
other studies in state courts have shown sentencing juries to 
impose more severe and more varied sentences than judges.287 
One possible explanation for these discrepancies is the surprising 
lack of information given to juries during the sentencing process. 
In those states utilizing noncapital sentencing juries, jurors are 
not provided with sentencing guidelines or probation statistics 
prior to rendering a punishment;288 rather, they are simply asked 
to select a sentence somewhere within the statutory sentencing 
range.289 Additionally, “aggravating and mitigating factors” that 
might assist the jury in making a decision are generally not 
identified by statute, nor included in the jury instructions.290 
Ultimately, “[n]o state provides juries with anywhere near the 
amount of sentence-related information that is currently provided 
to judges.”291 Without such information, one wonders how 
                                                                                                     
 284. See Parese, supra note 63, at 687 (noting, for example, that the 
Apprendi Court’s decision to involve the jury in the sentencing process “missed 
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 289. See Nancy King, How Different Is Death? Jury Sentencing in Capital 
and Non-Capital Cases Compared, 2 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 195, 197 (2004) 
(referencing VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIM. NO. P44-100, which permits 
the jury in a rape case to select a sentence anywhere between five years and life 
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 290. Id. 
 291. Iontcheva, supra note 279, at 367.  
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sentencing juries can effectively fulfill the Sixth Amendment 
rights they serve to protect.292 
While jurors have limited guidance and experience within 
the realm of sentencing, judges are repeat players. “With superior 
sentencing experience, a judge may have less apprehension about 
early parole release, less expectation that a sentence might be 
reduced, a better idea of what an average sentence is, and 
sometimes [has] even more mitigating information about the 
offender than the jury. . . .”293 Additionally, judges have more 
exposure to a range of criminals and are able to save the more 
severe sentences for those defendants they recognize as the worst 
offenders; a first-time juror, however, may view each offender “as 
the worst criminal she’s ever seen.”294 Most important, sentencing 
requires a certain level of judicial skill that only a judge develops:  
[S]entencing is about more. It is about proportionality; it 
requires individualizing so that the punishment fits the crime. 
It is not now, nor has it ever been, a one size fits all approach. 
It continues to be about deterrence and rehabilitation. Indeed, 
far from being incompetent or illegitimate, judicial decision-
making is central to that enterprise.295 
Moreover, a judge is required to write an opinion that is subject 
to scrutiny; in the case of sentencing juries, however, appellate 
review extends only to “the grossest of errors,” such as sentencing 
outside the statutory range.296 Thus, without a solid 
understanding of the “larger sentencing framework,” sentencing 
juries run the risk of returning to the inconsistent, bias-ridden 
sentences of the pre-Guidelines era.297  
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 296. King, supra note 289, at 197. 
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While many proponents of sentencing juries justify the 
practice as a protection of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
rights, a brief inspection of this bifurcated process shows that 
there may be other motives at play. Prosecutors have a major 
stake in sentencing by jury in that they can use the bifurcated 
process as a tool to push defendants into plea deals: “‘[J]uries will 
really lay it on somebody who deserves it,’ reported an Arkansas 
prosecutor, ‘I think the fear of having those 12 people do that to 
‘em, it moves a lot of cases. . . .’”298 Ultimately, the “wild card” 
aspect of jury sentencing and its effect on defendants’ 
decisionmaking begs the question: is sentencing by jury truly a 
mark of democracy or is it a mere bargaining chip for the 
prosecution?299 As Justice Breyer noted in Blakely, a sentencing 
system that relies too heavily on plea bargaining gives 
prosecutors a great deal of control over the sentence, thereby 
weakening the relation between real conduct and real 
punishment.300 Similarly, Ohio State University law professor 
Douglas A. Berman warns that this type of prosecutorial power 
will continue to perpetuate disparate sentencing because unlike a 
judge’s decision, which is made public, there is no real 
mechanism to review a prosecutor’s discretion.301 Thus, the end 
result of the proposed bifurcated process—a chilling effect that 
discourages defendants from exercising their right to a jury 
trial—runs afoul of the Sixth Amendment’s constitutional 
guarantees.302  
                                                                                                     
comprehensive understanding of this framework, juries will render disparate 
judgments in similar cases).  
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 300. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 338 (2004) (Breyer, J., 
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 301. See Sarah Glazer, Sentencing Reform: Are Mandatory Sentences Too 
Harsh?, in CQ REPORTER 27, 30 (Thomas J. Billitteri ed., 2014) (noting that, 
according to Professor Berman, disparate sentencing now occurs in the privacy 
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jury sentencing. Nancy King and Rosevelt Noble refer to this interest as 
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In addition to the aforementioned judicial concerns, there are 
unavoidable administrative problems associated with the 
implementation of sentencing juries. While the Court has made 
clear that “principle is more important than pragmatism”303 in 
regards to fulfilling the Sixth Amendment, it seems foolish to 
discount the practicalities of sentencing administration.304 As the 
dissenters in Apprendi emphasized, the Court’s gradual shift 
away from judicial fact-finding during sentencing has been 
heavily based on constitutional ideals, without much 
consideration for the administrative consequences.305 For 
example, similar to the habitual-offender scheme discussed in 
Part IV.1, if the Court overturns Almendarez-Torres and 
institutes sentencing juries to account for the prejudice of prior 
convictions, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause may 
present administrative difficulties during sentencing. Pursuant to 
Williams v. New York,306 the Confrontation Clause does not apply 
at sentencing proceedings.307 However, “[a]lthough the 
evidentiary rules do not apply to sentencing hearings in federal 
or state courts, the overlapping protections of the Sixth 
Amendment’s confrontation clause . . . still might require that a 
defendant be allowed to cross-examine witnesses . . . .”308 There is 
substantial debate as to whether Williams is the appropriate 
precedent in determining whether the Confrontation Clause 
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 306. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
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when the defendant’s sentence was based on information supplied by witnesses 
with whom the accused had no opportunity to confront).  
 308. DEMLEITNER ET AL., supra note 63, at 451. 
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applies at sentencing proceedings; rather, many commentators 
believe that the Apprendi series of cases is the more appropriate 
line of precedent.309 Given that the Apprendi saga carved out a 
more active role for the jury during sentencing, such a shift in 
precedent would indicate that the Confrontation Clause may 
eventually apply to sentencing—the more trial-like sentencing 
proceedings become, the greater influence evidentiary rules could 
have on the federal sentencing process.310 Such a development 
would obviously complicate sentencing procedures in a system 
without the prior convictions exception.  
In addition to evidentiary issues, sentencing juries pose 
additional practical concerns—the main one being cost, both in 
time and money.311 Financially, the bifurcation of cases means 
extending jury duty to the sentencing stage, thereby increasing 
jury fees and the amount of “productivity lost” to this elongated 
jury duty.312 The cost in time and resources is equally 
burdensome.313 While “bifurcation” suggests that there will only 
be two parts to a trial, many cases will involve multiple 
defendants along with multiple enhancements. In this more 
complex scenario, would the jury be required to try all of these 
issues in sequence? What if the defendants risk prejudicing one 
another in respect to jury consideration of later issues? While the 
pro-Apprendi majority has maintained that constitutional 
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principles must come before pragmatism,314 the aforementioned 
questions demonstrate the cumbersome and unavoidable realities 
that the Court would need to resolve were it to bifurcate cases 
and implement sentencing juries.315  
V. Conclusion 
By the time the Court reached the final case in its march 
through the Apprendi revolution, it had built an extensive 
arsenal of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.316 Returning absolute 
fact-finding to the jury box, Alleyne left many defendants hopeful 
that Almendarez-Torres would consequently be overruled and 
that the finding of prior convictions would finally be removed 
from the purview of the judge.317 There is a crucial disconnect, 
however, between the issue at hand and the remedy being sought. 
Why are defendants with prior convictions so concerned with the 
possibility of a judge finding the existence of prior criminal 
history? Are they concerned with the way the convictions are 
proved or are they concerned with the amount of punishment 
that follows as a result? It seems reasonable to assume that 
defendants are mostly concerned with the fact that a prior 
conviction can expose them to a more severe, enhanced sentence. 
Overturning Almendarez-Torres, however, is not the right vehicle 
to address this concern.  
If Alleyne was to mark the death of Almendarez-Torres, the 
Court would either need to institute (1) repeat-offender laws, 
which would result in prejudice during the guilt-determination 
stage, or (2) sentencing juries, which would likely prove too 
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cumbersome a process to implement throughout our entire 
criminal justice system. Both of these options pose judicial and 
administrative frustrations, including the possibility of 
prosecutorial abuse, inconsistent sentencing, uninformed juries, 
evidentiary issues, and the unnecessary expenditure of time and 
money.318 The result, therefore, becomes the weighing of a 
doctrinaire invocation of a constitutional right and the benefits it 
provides to defendants versus the cost such a right would impose 
on the judicial system. While “unequivocal” constitutional rights 
should trump concerns of judicial administration,319 that is not 
the case here. As previously discussed, the pro-Apprendi Court’s 
broad Sixth Amendment interpretation is riddled with 
imperfections. The alleged right to have a prosecutor prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt the fact of prior convictions to a jury is 
far from well-established and “unequivocal,” and as such, should 
not take precedent over a myriad of unfavorable, burdensome 
consequences that would result from the implementation of a 
post-Almendarez-Torres sentencing system.  
Ultimately, opponents of Almendarez-Torres will need to look 
to the legislature, to the Eighth Amendment perhaps, if they 
want to change the ways in which prior convictions affect 
sentences.320 Defendants will not achieve a reduction in exposure 
to sentencing enhancements by simply changing the adjudicatory 
factfinder of prior convictions. Having envisioned the framework 
of a sentencing system without Almendarez-Torres, the question 
arises: how many times would a defendant actually choose to 
present or challenge a prior conviction, which has already been 
found with procedural safeguards, and voluntarily open himself 
up to prejudice from the jury? The answer is likely almost none. 
Thus, even if the Court were to determine that Almendarez-
Torres violates the Sixth Amendment, overturning the prior 
convictions exception would not procure the victory against over-
punishment that defendants are truly seeking; therefore, the 
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Court should confirm the viability of Almendarez-Torres and 
sustain the prior convictions exception. 
